THE MAGAZINE OF THE ANTS, OR PISMIRE JOURNAL.

The RELIGION *of the Kingdom of* ANTS, *&c.*

THERE is nothing that ſhews the folly of a people ſo much, as that of arrogating to themſelves more than they are poſſeſſed of. All ranks of creatures of various degrees in the ſcale of beings, have their own ſhare of underſtanding and knowledge; and it is highly probable that according as they are placed in the ſeveral parts of the univerſal ſyſtem, every people have powers and faculties ſuited to the part they are to act in, *The Ants are a people not ſtrong* yet they have wiſdom *to provide their meat in the ſummer*, which is really more than can be ſaid of many in the human family.

It is a common maxim among men to determine the characters and obligations of beings, according to their endowments and privileges, and the uſe they make of them. With regard to the Deity, the obligations of all creatures to ſerve and obey him, muſt ariſe from the knowledge they have of his character and will. Whatever way this knowledge comes, whether from natural inſtinct, or from ſuper-natural revelation, it is much the ſame thing: it is a revelation of the firſt cauſe and his mind to his creatures. It is, perhaps, owing to ſome thing in the anatomy of certain animals, that their inſtinct ſerves inſtead of reaſon, and that they anſwer the ends of their creation by ſenſitive feelings impreſt upon their animal ſouls by the author of nature. As ws are not well acquainted with the language of brutes, we are ready to miſunderſtand the ſigns they make uſe of to convey their ideas to one another. With regard to the human ſpecies, there are few creatures that would chuſe to converſe with them, pro-

vided they were totally left to their liberty; and however mean an opinion we have of many animals, there is reaſon to believe that they conſider us in as indifferent a view as we do them. They are indeed, by the laws of Providence, confined to be our ſervants, but it ſeldom happens, unleſs they are under *ſpecial reſtraint*, that they readily ſubmit to their maſters. The exceptions, with reſpect to ſome domeſtic animals, ariſes more from a corruption of their animal nature, by the *food* and *treatment* they receive, than from any diſpoſition to be the ſlaves of men. It is as eaſy to make ſome men ſlaves, as it is to enſlave other creatures, and it is in the nature of no creature to be in bondage to another if it could help it. All ſorts of creatures may, by habit, have their natures altered, in a great meaſure, but this is no argument againſt the creatures acting otherwiſe, provided they were ſuffered to take their own way, and to follow nature.

Among the ſeveral tribes of people in the animal world, there are two, though they are ſmall in ſtature, that are endowed with great wiſdom and ſagacity. Theſe are the Bees, and the Ants. Solomon has determined the latter to be a people, and therefore it cannot be reckoned profane to aſcribe to them the attributes of other people, whoſe manners and characters are ſimilar. If they are a people, which we cannot doubt without contradicting the ſcriptures, they will certainly have ſome principles and forms of religion, unleſs they be like the Hottentots, whom ſome travellers affirm to have no notions of any religion at all. But thoſe who do not underſtand the *ſigns*, and *language* of a people, are but very improper judges of their religion; and their teſtimony ought not to be received when it tends to reproach a whole community with a charge of infidelity. The community of Ants have been taken notice of by both philoſophers and poets, and they have their name and character expreſſed in almoſt all languages. The Hebrews call an Ant, *Nemaleh*; the Greeks, *Myrmos*; the Latins, *Formica*; the French, *Fourmi*; the Dutch, *Piſmire*; the Saxon, *Emmet*; and the preſent Engliſh, hold by the term *Ant*. What agreement there is between thoſe names and that people is not eaſy to determine. The word, *nemaleh*, ſignifies literally to circumciſe; but this will not prove that the Ants are of the Jewiſh principles, and that they practiſe circumciſion, more than it will prove that the Myrmydons, among the Greeks, were Piſmires, becauſe their name is derived from *Myrmos*.

That the Emmets have real ideas of Providence will hardly be diſputed by thoſe who pay any regard to the teſtimony of Solomon, for he affirms, that though they are not a ſtrong people,

people, yet they provide their meat in the ſummer, and make uſe of the ſeaſons which Providence hath given them; and he directs thoſe who pay no regard to the ſeaſons which divine Providence has afforded them, to take an example from the Ants,—*Go to the Ant, thou ſluggard, conſider her ways and be wiſe, which, having no guide, overſeer, or ruler, provideth her meat in the ſummer, and gathereth her food in the harveſt.*—— From this obſervation of Solomon we may juſtly conclude, that this people are very ſtrict obſervers of the power and goodneſs of their Creator, and that they are qualified to be ſchool-maſters to many of the human race.—For how many who are endowed with *powers* and *capacities*, and are favoured with *opportunities*, amongſt the ſons of men, who neither *exerciſe* the one, nor *improve* the other? Among thoſe who profeſs religion there are very many who pay little attention to its ordinances, witneſs the thinneſs of our churches on a fine ſummer day. If men were to take an example from thoſe wiſe and ſagacious people, they would endeavour to make proviſion for their whole man, while the ſeaſon continued, and not diſpiſe the ſeaſons of Providence by providing only for one part, at the expence of another more important.

I hope the family of Adam will not be offended for my ſuppoſing that the Ants have ſome religion, and that they are poſſeſſed of powers to fulfil their obligations to their Maker, as well as men. That they believe in divine Providence I hope to prove, and that they are more diligent in their practice of duty than men, I think is ſelf evident, and needs no proof. How the community of Emmets come by their knowledge of religion, is a queſtion perhaps as eaſily anſwered, as how ſome men come by theirs. The Ants receive this knowledge from their Creator, which is more than can be ſaid of many thouſands of mankind, who receive theirs from their parents and nurſes, and know no more concerning it. Whether their religion is ſyſtematic or not, I will not affirm, nor deny; but if practice be any proof of order and ſyſtem, I think they muſt have a good ſyſtem, for their behaviour is orderly and conſiſtent with reaſon.

The firſt thing in all religion that deſerves the name, is the knowledge and belief of a divine Providence: without this firſt principle, all people whatſoever, are Atheiſts. That the Piſmires know and acknowledge this truth, will appear manifeſt, from both divine and profane authority. I have already mentioned the authority of Solomon, which, I hope, will be admitted. He ſays they obſerve ſummer and harveſt, know the ſeaſons and improve them. This muſt proceed either from ſome original dictates of nature, or from obſervation, and

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which ever way this knowledge comes, it is an evidence that they underſtand the courſe of Providence, and obſerve it. If this people have the knowledge of Providence ſtamped upon their nature, they are by nature no Atheiſts, and if they acquire this underſtanding by obſervation, they are Theiſts in practice, and nothing inferior to mankind in this particular.—In the one caſe, they will agree with thoſe who maintain innate ideas; and in the other, they will agree with the ſyſtem, or opinion of Mr *Locke*, and we know, even among ourſelves, there are ſome on both ſides of this queſtion.

If we ſuppoſe that the Ants attain to knowledge by tutorage and experience, they then muſt proceed *a poſteriore* by reaſoning from the effect to the cauſe, and by analogy, come to the knowledge of one thing by another. In this caſe they ſeem to receive the teſtimony of their ſenſes, which, there is no reaſon to conclude, are inferior to thoſe of other creatures;—and, by comparing their ſenſations, and the objects thereof, draw concluſions according to truth. According to Solomon, they know how to diſtinguiſh between ſummer and harveſt, which they could not eaſily do, except by experience. In the firſt they gather their meat, and in the latter their food; that is, they lay by a ſtock of inſect animal food, in ſummer, when *gnats* and *flies* are in ſeaſon, and in harveſt gather fruits and corn into their ſtore-houſes. This ſhews, that they both make obſervations, and reaſon upon them, and from comparing effects, proceed gradually to inveſtigate their cauſes. This people not only underſtand the ordinary courſe of Providence, but are very particular in conſidering extraordinary events, which is more than can be juſtly affirmed of many millions of the human race. The Ants are not only careful to improve the ſeaſons as they paſs, and hold time by the fore-lock, but are careful to guard againſt accidents before they happen, by obſerving the ſigns of the times, and the prognoſtics of calamity.

The heathen poet, *Virgil*, who ſeems to have been well acquainted with the character of this people, affirms, that before the rains come on, they remove their eggs and proviſions from the cell where they have them ſtored, and form a ſort of drain to let the water run paſt *. When they are thus employed it is always a ſure ſign of rain, or ſtormy weather. This plainly ſhews that they muſt make obſervations upon the objects of nature, and have a real knowledge of the ſpecial ſigns of certain events;—that they mark the ſigns of Providence, and hide themſelves before the evil day approaches. How happy would it be for men were they thus wiſe,

* Sepius et tectis penetralibus extulit ova
Anguſtum formica terens iter. VIRG. GEO. L. 1. 180.

wiſe, to mark the way of Providence, and, from the ſigns which the Almighty has afforded them, be provided againſt the approaching evil day! Had the Jews been as wiſe as this people, perhaps they would have eſcaped that deſtruction that overtook them, but they could not diſcern the ſigns of the times, and proceeded in folly till they were ruined. Whether we call this inſtinct or reaſon, one thing is certain, that it is a branch of uſeful knowledge worthy of human conſideration.

That the Ants have faith in a Providence is evident from their works; for that they fear evil is a proof that they believe it; and that they are perſuaded of good is evident from their purſuing of it. Their belief in the author of nature is plain, from the care they take to underſtand the ſignatures of his Providence, and to conduct themſelves according to their apprehenſions of what is to happen. No man can call this leſs than *reverence*, whether it proceed from an *Ant* or from a *Man*. In a man we will call it *reaſonable devotion*, in an Ant we will call it *inſtinct*, but where is the difference? All the difference ariſes from our pride, which makes us endeavour to obtain a monopoly of all things, whether they be juſtly obtained or not. All faith in the Providence of God implies, that thoſe that believe therein underſtand ſomething of his character, and that he has made himſelf known to them by ſome means ſuited to their nature and capacity. In whatever way this knowledge is conveyed, it is certainly the knowledge of the Almighty, and whatever kind of confidence ariſes therefrom, it is a ſort of faith in the Deity. The family of Emmets are a people that are endowed with a ſupernatural underſtanding, for there is no organization of matter that we know of, that can produce the ideas of order, or the knowledge of a Providence. This knowledge is as much ſupernatural to brutes as to man, and is a gift beſtowed upon them, which does not ariſe from the formation of their bodies, but from ſome qualities of a mind that their bodies are endowed with.

If we can prove that the Ants are alſo endowed with reaſon, we will then be able to diſcover what the various principles of their religion are.—And this ſhall, in the firſt place, be attempted. The actions of any people are the beſt evidences to prove their rationality. If we ſaw a people build fine cities, lay out fine ſtreets, rear regular edifices, plan fortifications, erect graneries, and ſtore them in all proper ſeaſons with neceſſary proviſions, we would certainly conclude, that they were endowed with reaſon, and poſſeſſed no ſmall degree of knowledge.

The

The author of *Spectacle de la Nature*, affirms from obſervation, "That the Ants form a kind of oblong city, divided "into ſtreets, that terminate at different magazines, ſome of "them conſolidate the earth, and prevent it from falling in, by "a ſurface of glue, with which they incruſt it.—Thoſe whom "we commonly ſee amaſs ſeveral ſplinters of wood, which they "draw over the tops of the ſtreets, and uſe them as rafters "to ſuſtain the roofs, and acroſs theſe they lay another rank "of *ſplinters*, and cover them with an heap of dry *ruſhes*, "*graſs*, and *ſtraw*, which they raiſe with a double ſlope to "turn the current of the water from their magazines; ſome "of which are appropriated to receive their proviſions, and in "others they depoſite their *eggs*, and the *worms*, that pro-"ceed from them." Since this people diſcover ſo much reaſon in the things that fall under our obſervation, and behave with ſo much wiſdom in their conduct, with regard to objects of ſenſe, there is good reaſon to conclude, that, with reſpect to inviſible objects they have a like proportion of wiſdom and underſtanding. It is only by the actions and behaviour of men that we know that THEY are endowed with reaſon; for language and words are no infalliable ſigns of a rational creature. There are many that can ſpeak well, and utter articulate expreſſions, according to the ordinaty ſtile of language, that ſcarcely diſcover any ſymptoms of reaſon according to the true acceptation of that word. If that it be by the ſimilitude of actions, and conduct, that we determine creatures to be alike rational, we will, by comparing the conduct of the Ants and the human race, be obliged to allow, that in the article of reaſon that ſmall people is in many reſpects ſuperior to us.

There is another point neceſſary to be conſidered before we proceed, and that is, Whether the Ants are endowed with a conſcience, or not? I ſhould not have mentioned this point, but have taken it for granted, had not ſeveral writers upon religious ſubjects made a diſtinction between *reaſon* and *conſcience*. Conſcience is a power in all people which determines concerning their *thoughts* and *actions* upon principles of right reaſon, and the concluſion which is drawn by conſcience from thoſe principles, is the ſame with right reaſon itſelf. People may diſpute as long as they pleaſe concerning words, but wherever reaſon is found among men, there alſo will conſcience be preſent. By analogy then I would infer, that if reaſon is found among the Piſmires, that they muſt alſo be poſſeſſed of conſcience, and of conſequence be capable of *internal* and *external* acts of religion. It is no reproach to the human race that other people are poſſeſſed of religious endowments as well

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as them. I know that this ſentiment will awaken the pride and chagrin of ſome *ſelfiſh*, *vain*, and *hypocritical* minds,—— who not only want to have man lord over all creatures, but alſo are deſirous that the whole creation ſhould be accounted a ſort of mere lumber laid by for the uſe of man. They are not ſatisfied with ruling over, and devouring the other creatures to ſatisfy their appetites, but have an anxious inclination to depricate their characters, becauſe Providence has permitted them to eat many of the reſt of animals for food.

But a lion or an aligator might make uſe of the ſame argument when they devour any of the human ſpecies, and conclude, that they were not only deſtined for their food, but were poor, deſpicable, two legged creatures, intended for no other purpoſe, than to be food for a more ſuperior race of animals. But ſuch arguments are unjuſt on either ſide; for all the creatures upon this earth have a more noble intention than to be food for others. Though Providence has made ſuch a grant to man, and other creatures, as that they may live upon one another, yet this is no more their chief intention, than it is the intention of a man killed by lightening, to be made for that purpoſe. The human race ought to look upon their fellow creatures with more humility than they generally do; for if they compare themſelves with other people in the ſcale of beings, they may find no great reaſon to boaſt of their ſuperior excellency. A fiſh, in the water, will be as much ſuperior to a man, as a man is ſuperior to a fiſh upon dry land, and every creature in its own ſphere and element is deſigned to ſhew forth the wiſdom and providence of God; and, for aught that we know, adore their Creator in their element as well as we do in ours.

But, to return to the kingdom and community of Ants.—We have made it evident that theſe people have reaſon and conſcience, and, conſequently, are fitted for ſome ſort of religion, and religious exerciſes. There muſt, of conſequence, be ſome principles upon which they proceed, and a theory that they obſerve. We cannot well ſuppoſe that the exerciſe of right reaſon will proceed differently in its operations in rational beings, but that from an *angel* down to an *ant* it will operate the ſame way. If there is any religion natural to reaſonable creatures, its principles muſt be the ſame, as far as reaſon is concerned, and if religion is revealed and not natural, its principles muſt alſo be conſiſtent with the character of him that makes the revelation.

The greateſt part of people who have written concerning religion, have admitted that there is ſome notices concerning God, and the duties that rational beings owe to him, natural to them

them all. That is to ſay, that, without any immediate revelation from God, his works ſuggeſt to their minds his exiſtence, and attributes, and impreſs their conſciences with a ſenſe of obligation. This ſeems to be the doctrine of an inſpired apoſtle, who affirms, that *The inviſible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, ſo that they are without excuſe* *. And he adds afterwards,—*That the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law; theſe having not the law, are a law unto themſelves; which ſhew the works of the law written in their hearts, their conſciences alſo bearing joint witneſs, and their thoughts mean while either accuſing or apologizing for one another* †. From theſe obſervations of the apoſtle it appears manifeſt, that the ſpiritual wiſdom, power, and character of the Deity, is manifeſted to the conſciences of men by the viſible works of the creation; and, that theſe objects of our ſenſes, convey to rational minds ideas of the exiſtence and attributes of God. This is what is meant by natural religion, and it is ſo called to diſtinguiſh it from that which is more immediately ſupernatural, which is made in divine revelation, contained in the Old and New Teſtaments;—where there are many things made known, which the works of creation and Providence do not at all make manifeſt. There are even ſome attributes of God that are not diſplayed in the works of creation, which the ſcriptures clearly point out. Of theſe, mercy is one, which could never have been diſcovered from all the various views of *the heavens* and *the earth*.

As we have conſidered reaſon and conſcience to be the ſame in all people, and have determined that duty and obligation ariſes from the knowledge they have of their Creator, we have reaſon to conclude, that, in the community of Ants, the ideas of obligation are the ſame as among men. It will from hence follow, that, provided any new notices or diſcoveries of the will of their Maker ſhould happen at any time to be made, that new obligations muſt ariſe from theſe diſcoveries: for whatever the Deity is pleaſed to reveal, muſt be an object of faith as ſoon as it is known, and an obligation to believe it becomes a reaſonable duty. The very law of nature obliges all people, endowed with powers and capacities, to believe a divine teſtimony,—to receive with readineſs the record which the Almighty has given to the world, concerning himſelf and his will. But let us proceed to take a connected view of thoſe doctrines which the principles of nature, in the firſt place ſuggeſt to all people, endowed with reaſon and underſtanding.

I. The

* Romans i. 20. † Romans ii. 14.

1. The being and exiſtence of a firſt cauſe, or that there is a God. There have been very few who have denied this truth, yet there have been ſome who have greatly perplexed it with vain and unreaſonable conceits. The heathens, in general, admitted the being and exiſtence of a Deity, but they were totally at a loſs who he was, and aſcribed divine perfections to mere creatures. They were ignorant of the divine unity, and therefore multiplied the number of their Gods. Nature ſuggeſted to them that there was a Creator, but it could not ſhew ſpecifically the character that diſtinguiſhes the Deity from all falſe objects of worſhip and adoration. Reaſon, provided there were no corruption in the ſubject in which it acts, would lead men directly to the true character of God, but as the ſubject is depraved, reaſon is, in its actions imperfect, and cannot ſee far for want of an inſtrument.

Reaſon, abſtractly conſidered, is a perfect principle, but reaſon in man is imperfect, becauſe both the organs of *ſenſe*, and the *powers of the human mind*, which are neceſſary for the exerciſe of reaſon, are weak and much debilitated. In a courſe of reaſoning, no people can proceed farther than their knowledge extends; often prejudice makes them reaſon againſt conviction, and the little knowledge they have. Were men qualified without *inſtruction* and *tutorage*, to produce ſuch arguments as they do, after they are inſtructed, in the doctrine of the being of a God, it would be a plain proof that nature was a ſufficient ſchool for learning this doctrine; but the greateſt part of the proofs that we have ſtanding upon record, are the works of men, who have been taught by others, how to reaſon from *hiſtory*, *obſervation*, and *experience*. And here we muſt obſerve, that there is a wide difference between believing the exiſtence of a Deity, and being able to prove it. It is, perhaps, a firſt principle to believe in God, and what all people would do, except they were corrupted, and ſeduced from the truth; but to prove this point requires a courſe of reaſoning which every one is not capable to purſue. Neither is it manifeſt, that thoſe who reaſon beſt, have the ſtrongeſt confidence in the Deity. There are two ſources of arguments for the exiſtence of God to the vulgar, and theſe are, the *dictates of conſcience*, and *the ſcriptures*. The firſt all men have, and Chriſtians have both. The laboured arguments which Philoſophers and divines have formed, to prove the being and exiſtence of a Deity, are unknown language to the common people in general, and might have been as well delivered in any foreign language, as in the vulgar tongue; for the mode, or manner of reaſoning is quite beyond the apprehenſion of the unlearned.

That there is a God, his wonderful works declare, and ſet forth to every perſon's view. *The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament ſhews forth his handy work.* Every man, endowed with the organs of ſenſe, and a common meaſure of underſtanding, by contemplating the works of creation, muſt be led at laſt to ſome firſt cauſe. Common ſenſe will teach the clown, as well as the philoſopher, that thoſe things that are ſeen muſt have had a beginning, for the viciſſitudes which he perceives in all things leads him to this idea. In reaſoning, or rather obſerving things, *a poſteriore*, common ſenſe will tell any man, that there muſt be a *ne plus ultra*, where he muſt ſtop; that objects of ſenſe, though they may have been long, could not be from eternity, becauſe all the parts of matter can be varied, and of conſequence, the whole could not be eternal, without ſuppoſing that decay and corruption, is an eſſential attribute of an eternal being. If matter is eternal, the ſmalleſt meaſure of underſtanding will teach us that all its parts muſt be ſo; but how comes it to paſs, that ſo many millions of parts of an eternal deſigning being are every moment fading away, through corruption, and inſtead of eternity ſet forth the ſtrongeſt image of change and imperfection. The very courſe of nature plainly teach us, that there is no eternity in matter, otherwiſe eternity and change are the ſame things, and ſuggeſt the ſame ideas. It may, with great juſtice and propriety, be affirmed, that there is no ſuch idea in the univerſe as the idea of eternal matter; for all the inſtruction which our ſenſes affords us concerning bodies, is, that they change their ſituation, and are liable to decay. From the works of creation we may eaſily learn, that the things which are made did not make themſelves, though we cannot, from theſe works, determine all the perfections of the author of the univerſe. The ſyſtematic writers of divinity have given us a number of metaphyſical arguments, concerning the being and exiſtence of a firſt cauſe, which are exceedingly pretty play things to the imagination, but the arguments of Mr Ray, Derham, and Newingtytt are far more convincing and demonſtrative. Theſe philoſophic divines, have, by a great number of experiments, proved, to the demonſtration of both ſenſe and reaſon, that no kind of matter whatſoever, could either be eternal, or direct itſelf without the power and energy of an infinite firſt cauſe diſtinct from itſelf. I ſhall, in the courſe of this work, probably offer ſome new argument upon this ſubject, which, I hope will give an additional light to the former reaſonings that have been uſed upon this point. In the mean time, to ſhew the reader the method that has been practiſed, I ſhall offer a few arguments of the abſtract kind,

kind, that they may perceive the difference between bare reaſoning, and actual experiments.

1. The being of a God is a truth, no leſs evident than that of our own, and it appears to be a conſequence of it, for, as we are certain that we ourſelves exiſt, ſo, from this perſuaſion, we may conclude, that ſomething has ever been. For if we ſuppoſe, that there was once nothing, we may as ſurely conclude, that neither we, nor any thing elſe, could have exiſted; for it is not within the reach of human conception to conceive that nothing could produce ſomething, or that any being could produce itſelf. From hence it may be certainly inferred, that ſome being muſt have eternally exiſted, otherwiſe there would have been no time, nor beings to exiſt in time. From this method of reaſoning it will alſo appear evident, that ſome firſt cauſe independent upon the things that are made, muſt have exiſted neceſſarily, and never had any beginning. The exiſtence of this being muſt be abſolute, and independent upon both its own will, and all the effects that it hath, or can produce. This ſort of exiſtence, for want of a better word, we call, *ſelf-exiſtence*, of which we have but very indiſtinct ideas, and loſe ourſelves when we proceed to deſcribe it. There are no higher reaſons of the exiſtence of the Deity, than are implied in the divine nature; for we cannot conceive that the being of God could poſſibly depend either on his own will, or that of any other being; of conſequence, he muſt be ſtrictly and abſolutely neceſſary in his exiſtence. That we may have as clear an idea of this ſubject as our imperfect knowledge and language will admit, let us remember in the firſt place, that the reaſon of an abſolute neceſſity of exiſtence implies no leſs than all poſſible and actual perfections, or, that there is no kind or degree of perfection, which is not comprehended in the nature of ſuch a neceſſary being; for it is manifeſt as any demonſtration, that the author of all beings can himſelf want nothing of that perfection, which he has communicated to his creatures. Secondly, There is no imperfection in any being, but what implies a poſſibility of greater, and further imperfections, and may proceed ſo far as to terminate in non-exiſtence; but if we argue fairly, we muſt conclude, that the reaſon why the exiſtence of *matter* and *motion*, or the things which we ſee are continued in being, proceeds from a cauſe that is infinite and unchangeable. On this head it may be added, that it is impoſſible to have any idea of the beginning of a firſt cauſe, and, conſequently, the firſt thing that all the arguments taken from the works of creation and Providence prove, is, that there is an eternal firſt cauſe.

Secondly,

Secondly, The being of a Deity may be proved from the inconſiſtency of ſuppoſing that matter is eternal, and motion an eſſential property thereof. That matter is not eternal, has been proved already, and that motion is not eſſential to matter, is manifeſt from the idea of *reſt*, which is as *eſſential* to ſome parts of matter as motion itſelf. All men have as preciſe an idea of *reſt* as of *motion*, and indeed the one ſuppoſes the other; for if there were no reſt, motion ought certainly to have another name. If motion be an eſſential property of matter, it muſt extend to all the parts thereof, of whatſoever *quality* or *magnitude;* but our ſenſes inform us, that this is not the caſe, becauſe many parts of matter continue at reſt, while others are moved by the ſwifteſt motion. But, what is ſtill more abſurd, motion implies a mover, and if motion be an eſſential property of matter, it muſt imply alſo an *eſſential mover*, without which there could be no motion. it is beyond all the limits of credibility to conceive, that any one part of matter poſſeſſed eternally what others wanted, which muſt really be the caſe, when we admit reſt to be as eſſential to ſome parts thereof, as motion is to others.

Motion, according to materialiſt, ought to have the ſame degree in all the parts of matter, and of conſequence, every particle muſt have moved alike, in this caſe, *comparative reſt* and *ſwiftneſs* muſt have been equally impoſible, and *ſameneſs* and *uniformity* muſt have excluded all ſorts of variety, and have manifeſted itſelf throught the whole univerſe. But experience teaches us that *variety*, *ſwiftneſs*, and *reſt*, are as *truely* objects of our *ſenſes* and *mind* as *motion*, which proves that *motion* is no eſſential property of matter.

Spinoſa, and Mr *Hobbes*, have aſcribed intelligence to their ſyſtem of nature; and the firſt affirms, that there is only one *numerical ſubſtance;* that the *material world, and every part thereof, is the only neceſſary exiſting being*. Theſe two Atheiſtical writers, though they attributed intelligence to matter, yet they never proceeded ſo far as to affirm, that either the whole, or any part thereof, poſſeſſed an eſſential freedom and liberty of action, without which, it is impoſſible there could be any beginning of motion. Had they aſcribed freedom to any one part of matter, they muſt have aſcribed the ſame to all, and muſt have, in that caſe, contradicted their own experience, and that of all the world alſo. But here they ſtopt, and could proceed no further. Eternity does not ſo much as enter into the idea of matter; for if matter is eternal, it muſt exiſt of itſelf, which is the moſt excellent of all perfections, and neceſſarily implies all others.—For if it exiſt of itſelf, it muſt be *independent*, *almighty*, *eternal*, and *immutable*, or, in

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THE MAGAZINE OF THE ANTS, OR PISMIRE JOURNAL.

PART II.

The CIVIL POLICY *of the* ANTS, *&c.*

A Well founded and right regulated civil policy, tends much to the peace and happineſs of any people. Perhaps if legiſlators and politicians had remembered *Solomon's* advice to the ſluggard, and learned wiſdom from the Ants, there had never been ſo many convulſions in the ſtates and kingdoms of this world as have happened, during the progreſs of ſociety, in the various parts of this globe.

The civil policy of any people is, *that method of government* which all the ſubjects are bound to obſerve, for the real or ſuppoſed good of the whole community. This is different, in different nations, according as the people are different in wiſdom or folly. The general laws of nations, are the practical ſignatures of their policy, and determine them to be politically wiſe or fooliſh. When laws are made that do not proceed from ſound reaſon, and the real nature of things, but have their exiſtence from an overbearing Junto of a ſtate, they may then be conſidered as impolitic mandates, proceeding from *pride*, *ſelf*, or *caprice*. Sound policy, or juſt ideas

of good government, are the principles upon which laws ſhould be eſtabliſhed; but when legiſlators are bad politicians, they form laws more according to *private intereſt*, or *whim*, than upon thoſe principles of *ſound policy*, that are ſuited to the nature of the community.

Where there is a right policy obſerved, the laws will always be *few*, *plain*, and *eaſily underſtood*; becauſe as it is every perſon's *intereſt* and *duty* to obey the laws, ſo it is alſo their *intereſt* and *duty* to underſtand them. A great multitude of laws argues the want of wiſdom in a nation; for where people have been remarkable for wiſdom, their laws have been always very few, and very plain. The laws of Moſes are few, and exceedingly ſimple, and, ſo far as they reſpect civil ſociety, may anſwer all nations under heaven, provided they would obſerve them. It is a proof of ſound policy, and wiſdom in legiſlation, when all who are intereſted in keeping the laws have a ſhare in the making of them, or at leaſt, every one in their turn may ſometime or other enjoy a ſhare in legiſlation. This will be the readieſt method to prevent tyranny of one man over many, or of ſome individuals over the reſt; when men conſider that they are to continue in the poſſeſſion of power only for a ſeaſon, it will naturally make them careful and cautious when they remember that in a ſhort time others may make laws as much contrary to their intereſt as they have done to them.

All legiſlative bodies of men ought to have but a temporary exiſtence; to continue them long in office, without bringing them back to a private ſtation, is a method that is ready to intoxicate them with the idea of power, and to make them forget their dependence upon the body politic. Both legiſlators and executors of laws ought to continue only but for a ſhort time, otherwiſe, unleſs they are under a divine influence, they will be ready to deſtroy in the end what they promiſed to carry on with wiſdom and juſtice in the beginning. After the Romans were wearied of

kings,

kings, on account of the ill behaviour, and tyrannical government of ſome of their princes, they made choice of two conſuls, who were only to have their power for one year, and for this reaſon, "That they might "not become inſolent through the continuance of "their power, but might be always ſenſible of their "dependence, when they knew that they were to be "reduced to a private ſtation, after one years ſer-"vice *."

The Roman commonwealth, which aſſumed its real, and beſt form in the 259 year of that empire, ſeems to have been eſtabliſhed according to the beſt rules of human policy. They formed two branches of a legiſlature, which comprehended all ranks of ſubjects, and two executive magiſtrates that continued only for one year. This appears to have been the moddel of the conſtitution of Britain, except, that a perpetual executive magiſtrate is ſubſtituted in the place of two conſuls. With regard to the advantage of the one above the other, much has been ſaid on both ſides; but it may be obſerved, that while a community is virtuous either of theſe forms will anſwer; but, in a degenerate ſtate of ſociety, conſuls are preferable to kings. If the executive authority were changed every year, it would be out of the power of the chief magiſtrate to corrupt the two branches of the legiſlature, and, as they knew they were accountable, it would have a conſiderable influence upon their behaving well. In the days of the Roman republic, that maxim of the lawyers was not known, namely, *that kings can do no wrong*. The Romans ſuppoſed the contrary, and guarded againſt its effects. Their conſuls had but a temporary exiſtence, and were liable to be puniſhed for voluntary miſconduct. They were conſidered as ſervants of the community, and accountable to the people. In extraordinary

* Et placuit, ne imperium longius quam annum unum haberent; ne per diuturnitatem poteſtatis inſolentiores redderentur; ſed civiles ſemper eſſent, qui ſe poſt annum ſcirent futuros eſſe privatos.

Eutropii Hiſtoria, lib. 1.

caſes this ſagacious people appointed ſome extraordinary officers, ſuch as dictators, but as theſe were generally the wiſeſt and beſt in the community, ſo they were liable to be removed, at the pleaſure of thoſe who appointed them. It was, for the moſt part, in times of war, that ſuch authority was granted to one man, that the ſprings of motion and action in the republic, might not work contrary ways, when there was ſuch urgent neceſſity for univerſal unanimity. But when this neceſſity was removed, they took away the power, leſt it ſhould hurt the virtue which ſaved them from danger, when the danger was over.

In the ancient ages of *Greece* and *Rome* every form of government that was practiſed appears to have been founded upon juſt reaſons of policy, and executed according to its true principles. Kings were the firſt dignity that was conferred upon magiſtrates, but not under the idea that has been annexed to that office, ſince ſociety has been ſo much corrupted. *Archbiſhop Potter*, in ſpeaking of the civil government of Athens, makes theſe judicious obſervations, and, as they come from a *Metropolitan of all England*, will undoubtedly be agreeable to many of my readers.

" Moſt nations at the firſt were governed by *kings*, " who were uſually perſons of great worth and re- " nown, and for their courage, prudence, and other " virtues, promoted to that dignity, by the general " conſent and election of the people; who yielded " them obedience, out of willingneſs, rather than " neceſſity; out of advice rather than compulſion: " And kings rather chooſe to be obeyed out of love " and eſteem of their virtues, and fitneſs to govern, " than by the force of their arms, and out of a " ſlaviſh fear of their power. They affected no un- " controulable dominion, or abſolute ſway, but " preferred the good of their people, for whoſe " protection they knew, and acknowledged them- " ſelves to have been advanced, before any cove- " tous or ambitious deſings of their own. They

expected

" expected no bended knees, no proſtrait faces, but " would condeſcend to converſe familiarly even with " the meaner ſort of their ſubjects, as oft as they " ſtood in need of their aſſiſtance. In ſhort, they " endeavoured to obſerve ſuch a juſt medium in " their behaviour, and all their actions, as might " neither expoſe their authority to contempt, nor " render them formidable to thoſe whom they " chooſe rather to win by kindneſs into a voluntary " compliance, than to awe by ſeverity into a forced " ſubjection. They propoſed to themſelves no " other advantage than the good and welfare of their " people, and made uſe of their authority no farther, " than as it was conducive, and neceſſary to that " end."

The ſame author obſerves, that in leading their people to war, kings, in thoſe days, not only aſſiſted them by their good conduct and management of affairs, but expoſed their perſons for the ſafety and honour of their country, preſſing forward into the thickeſt of their enemies, and often encountering the moſt valiant of them in ſingle combat. And this they thought a principal point of their duty, judging it but reaſonable that they who excelled in honour, ſhould ſurpaſs them alſo in valour; and they that had the firſt places at all feaſts, and public aſſemblies, ſhould be the firſt alſo in undertaking dangers, and expoſing themſelves in the defence of their country.—Such ideas ſeem to have prevailed among princes in the days of *Homer*, for the poet makes *Sarpedon* accoſt *Glaucus* in much the ſame ſtile with that of the archbiſhop, and from whom his grace ſeems to have taken his obſervations in part.

Since all the Lycian bands our nod obey:
To us, like gods, united homage pay;—
Since we firſt ſeated have our goblets crown'd,
And our rich tables with the beſt abound;
Then Glaucus! let us be the firſt of thoſe
To face the battle, and no fight our foes.

That

That our brave troops may never have to ſay,
We love to rule with arbitrary ſway,——
Drink the beſt wine, and firſt at feaſts appear,
But when our foes approach retreat for fear.

It was the ancient idea both of kings and their ſubjects, that all government was intended for the good of the community, and when this end was not anſwered, they conſidered government to be proſtituted, and its main end perverted. Achilles' character of Aggamemnon, is expreſſed in very ſtrong language upon this ſubject. He calls him *Demoboros Baſileus*, a king that devoured his people, or ſwallowed them up, but when danger approached, was as faint hearted as a ſtag. That line of Homer contains the ſevereſt reproach, and points out the ſtrongeſt contraſt of character that is to be found in any language.

Oinobares kunos ommat' ehon Kradien d' Elaphoio.

He calls him a *drunkerd*, ſays he had *eyes like a dog*, but *an heart like an hind*. In his behaviour to his ſubjects he was arbitrary and ſevere, but in aſſerting their rights againſt their enemies, he was cowardly and puſillanimous. This was a perverſion of the original policy upon which government was eſtabliſhed, and which the Greeks, in the days of Homer, ſtill ſeemed inclined to aſſert.

A compact between kings and people, is a very ancient notion, and is undoubtedly founded in nature. Even the kings of Iſrael and Judah, though they were nominated by God, yet were alſo choſen by the people, by the divine permiſſion, to make them underſtand, that it was for the good of the community that God permitted them, and that they were no longer of divine appointment than they anſwered that end. There is a ſtriking proof of this point, 1 Kings xii. 1. concerning the ſon of Solomon. It is ſaid in that paſſage, *That Rehoboam went to Shechem; for all Iſrael were come to Shechem to make him king*. This ſhews that hereditary right did not altogether give him a title, without the election of the people:—and, ſecondly, that the people had a right

right to reject him, provided he did not conform to reaſon, and the laws of his country.—For when the ten tribes renounced his government, the Almighty would not ſuffer him to fight with them, to bring them back to their former allegiance. It was not the policy of the king that prevented him from this mad enterprize, but the direction of God; which ſhews, that divine policy requires that king and people be united by compact; or whoever are the rulers of nations be choſen by the conſent of the people. The firſt part of the civil policy of the kingdom of Ants is, that none rule over them without their conſent, and in this they agree with the *Jews*, the *Greeks*, and the *Romans*, and all the moſt approved forms of government ſince the beginning of the world. It is not to be expected, that in one number of this Magazine that I ſhould finiſh each of the heads propoſed. They are intended each to make a volume by themſelves, and may be bound up ſeparately. The ſubject of every head will, therefore, be reſumed till the whole is compleatly finiſhed. I ſhall proceed at this time to ſhew what the civil policy of the Ants, and all creatures, under good government, is, or ought to be. Before I proceed, it may be neceſſary to conſider, how the civil policy, and the forms of civil government among any people differ. All forms of civil government are the practical policy of nations, or the effects of their deſigns in aſſociating together in one place, or under the ſame government; this the Greeks called *Politeuma*, or the adminiſtration of a ſtate, or commonwealth. When the adminiſtration of government, and the laws of the ſtate agreed, civil policy, and the form of government were conſidered as one and the ſame thing.—But when adminiſtration was made to differ from the laws, by the arts of deſigning politicians, then the forms of government and the policy were different. In this caſe, the word policy is taken in an evil ſenſe, and is become a common term to expreſs cunning and deceit.

Policy

Policy, which is but another name for the privileges and government of citizens, is often in its adminiſtration different from its principles. Laws are the principles of ſound policy, founded in reaſon, and juſtice; when the laws are ſuſpended for certain reaſons of ſtate, policy is ſet at various with government, and legiſlation is made to yield to policy or adminiſtration. This ſeldom happens among a wiſe and virtuous people; the principles of citizenſhip, which are the ſame with policy, and the practice thereof, are always the ſame, among ſuch a people as the Emmets. Through the long ſucceſſion of ages from the beginning of the world, it has never once been found that their principles and practice have differed.

As this people are very prolific, and increaſe faſt, they have ſent forth many colonies ſince the flood of Noah; theſe colonies, as ſoon as they ſettle in any different part of the earth, become free and independent ſtates, and are no other ways bound to their mother country, than by the law of friendſhip. They obſerve the ſame laws with all the other nations of Ants through the whole earth, but will not be dictated to by any other power except their own. They are like the bees in this particular, which, as ſoon as they leave their old hive, and form a new commonwealth, endeavour to acquire property, and preſerve it againſt every other power. If the mother hive ſhall happen to invade their rights and properties from any pretence of ancient authority, they will reſiſt them at the riſk of their lives, and ſupport their independency as long as one of them is alive. This appears to have been the practice of all people ſince the diviſion in the plains of *Shinaar*. The tribes that then ſeparated from the parent community, became diſtinct, and independent nations, and were governed by their own laws, and walked according to their own rules of policy. They conſidered the pretenders to univerſal empire, as invaders of the rights of mankind, and reſiſted them with

with all their might; and were willing rather to fall in the conflict than to part with their liberties.—*Nimrod* and *Chedorlaomer*, of infamous memory, were among the first after the flood, who attempted to enslave other nations, by assuming a jurisdiction over them, but they met with resistance in their attempts; and though they gained the battle, we do not find that they attained to their design. Abraham, who loved liberty, and was a friend of God and man vanquished the oppressors, and restored to every man his own. Never were men made slaves till they turned wicked; and none, except wicked men made slaves of their brethren, except when they invaded their rights, or were preparing to do it. The claims of authority of a parent country over colonies, had they been made in the first ages of the world, would have prevented the population of the earth, and frustrated the designs of Providene. It is plain, that Providence never intended that human jurisdiction should proceed further than the consent of parties, and the situation of people. All the great emperors of the world were only universal scourges of mankind, for their sin and wickedness, but never had any natural or divine apointment. Had men taken their maxims of government from the Ants, there would have been more peace and less war in the world, than there has been from the beginning. Nature itself would teach all men good goverment, provided they conformed to its dictates, and did not behave unnaturally.

It appears plain, in considering the progress of civil society, that a hereditary right to kingdoms is not an original, but an adventitious idea; for what a man cannot alienate, cannot properly be called his own. He is no more, in that case, than a tenant, who holds his right conditionally, by observing the rules that give him a tenure to his possessions.—Puffendorff observes—"That a king may dispose of "what is appointed for the support of his houshold, "according to his own pleasure, but cannot alienate

" the whole, or any part of the kingdom, without " the conſent of his ſubjects.—Neither can he alie- " nate the public money, without the conſent of " the people *." All this is conſiſtent with reaſon, to do otherwiſe is unjuſt and unreaſonable.

The ſame author affirms, that all juſt government is from God, from this conſideration, that it is founded in right reaſon, which is the gift of the Almighty;—and whatever form of government is not conſiſtent with reaſon and juſtice, is abſurd and unnatural. In ſome caſes a form of government may be right, and the execution and adminiſtration thereof abſurd and unjuſt; this happens when magiſtrates neglect to execute the laws, or when they pervert them for the ſake of obtaining an arbitrary authority over the people; or when they extend them beyond the limits of their firſt inſtitution, to caſes that were not ſuppoſed when they were made, and to which they cannot be applied without an unnatural ſtretch of interpretation.—— Among a virtuous people this will ſeldom or never happen. It is always a ſign of ambition in rulers, or deſipation in the ſubjects, when adminiſtration is contrary to juſtice and good government. It never continues long, except in the decline of ſtates, when they are near their latter end, of which it is, for the moſt part, a ſure prognoſtic. In virtuous communities,

* ——In multis civitatibus dantur peculiaria *bona publica*, quæ patrimonium reipublicæ aut regni ſolent adpellari. Quod alicubi iterum diſtinguitur in patrimonium principatus & reipublicæ ſeu fiſcum & ærarium quorum prius deſtinatum eſt ad ſuſtentionem regis, ejuſque familiæ; poſterius ad publicas utilitates regni. Circa prius rex habet uſumfructum, & de fructibus inde provenientibus pro ſuo arbitrio diſponere poteſt. Circa poſterius autem adminiſtratoris munus obit, idemque uſibus quibus deſtinatum eſt, adplicare debet. Neutrum niſi conſenſu populi aplicare poteſt.

Multo minus autem qui regnum non habet in patrimonio, totum regnum aut ejus partem *alienare* poteſt, niſi accedat conſenſus populi, & poſteriore caſu etiam peculiariter conſenſus partis alienandæ ſicut nec vice verſa membrum aliquod civitate invita ſeſe abrumpere poteſt, niſi [illegible] hoſtium in eam ſit redactum conditionem, ut aliter [illegible] Lib. ii. cap. xvi. 5. & 6.

munities, when administration perverts the laws, and injures the community, the administrators are called to an account, and punished, and better men preferred in their place; by which means it comes to pass, that others are affraid to abuse their trust, for fear of being made examples in like manner.—Public rewards and honours are conferred upon worthy men, which makes it honourable to be virtuous; this creates emulation to excel in well doing, and in this manner, *righteousness exalts a nation.*

In the family of Pismires, as far as their history is known, it has never yet been found, that there were any new laws made, or any of the old laws amended; and this seems to arise from there being no lawyers among them, to confound law and equity, which among that people are always the same. Perhaps it may be said, that this happens from their not being a mercantile people, and so have not such a variety of complicated cases to embarrass their jurisprudence. But this certainly is not the cause of their uniformity in righteousness.—Reason and justice are the same by land and sea, and few laws might serve for all cases that belong to them, whatever trade is carried on in either. Justice is a plain thing, and if every one would observe it, as well as they understand it, there would be no long trials or processes at law; and there would be as little necessity for lawyers, and gentlemen of the long robe. Statutes, when multiplied to excess, always perplex right, and it would be a wise course in legislators, when they make new laws, to destroy the old ones, in whose room the new ones are substituted; for it is impossible that there can be as many cases as there are statutes, and of consequence lawmakers create sins by making of laws. In some countries, without a new act of parliament, a man dare not break a window into his own house, nor dig a well in his field, which appears a very great hardship; for if it becomes just by a statute of parliament, it was undoubtedly just before, and the very

very nature of juſtice eſtabliſhes the right. Might not the general law which ſuppoſes that every man who builds a houſe upon his own ground may have as many windows as he pleaſes, and as much water in his field as he can obtain, anſwer the purpoſe in all caſes, where there is no diſpute about his right, without the expence of a new act of legiſlature?—Any perſon who would attempt to hinder it, ought to be ſent to the correction-houſe to learn better behaviour, which might ſerve inſtead of any new law.

There are ſome people whoſe manners are ſo ſimple, and ſo conſiſtant with nature, that their government is eaſily ſettled, and their laws exceedingly few. As far as the Ants are known they are a people of this kind. They have the ſame cuſtoms that they had in the days of Solomon, the ſame food, the ſame clothing, and the ſame diverſions and amuſements. They are a people naturally contented with their ſituation, and exceedingly patient in adverſity. In this they do not a little reſemble the French, who, though they are not under the beſt of governments, yet appear always happy, and make the beſt of all diſadvantages. They indeed differ much from the French and Engliſh, with regard to gallantry, for the Ants are exceedingly chaſte, and every married Ant keeps cloſe to his own mate, and ſhe to him. The younger ones never practiſe the rites of Venus till they are married, which renders them very fruitful and prolific. You will not ſee an Ant come the length of puberty emaciated with the *paphian* diſorder, nor is ſuch a thing as *Leake's pills* to be found in any of their cities. A young Piſmire would be aſhamed to ſhew his ſecrets to a ſurgeon's apprentice, or to have the *forceps* applied to his manhood. In that community all intercourſe with the ſex that is not honourable, is deemed a mortal crime, and unworthy of any of that family.

Their king, who is only choſen by the people, and rules by the conſent of all, ſupports the dignity of majeſty

THE MAGAZINE OF THE ANTS, OR PISMIRE JOURNAL.

PART III.

HISTORY *of the moſt remarkable* ANTS, *&c.*

IT is difficult to ſay, whether the hiſtory of individuals, or the hiſtory of a whole people affords the greater entertainment to a curious reader. As every perſon is but an individual himſelf, it will, perhaps, afford ſingle perſons more pleaſure to read the hiſtory of a people piece-meal, than if the general character of them had been given in a national hiſtory. The lives of remarkable perſonages, have been read with avidity by people of all ranks, in all nations, and when they have wearied of moral and dedactive writings, they have relieved themſelves with the pages of biography. The lives of *legiſlators*, *ſaints*, and *warriors*, have filled up the greateſt part of biographical writings. The hero of this eſſay ſhall be of none of thoſe characters. In the days in which he lived, it was not become faſhionable to knight men for their faith, nor to celebrate the fame of *politicians* and *public robbers*. In the firſt ages of the world, creeds were ſhort, laws were few, and kingdoms ſmall; ſo that ſaints paſſed unobſerved, legiſlators unnoticed, and heroes unregarded.

Both the ſeeds of virtue, and of vice were in the world, but did not come to there full growth in one age. It was not long till there were examples of both; Cain ſet an example of the latter, and Abel of the firſt. When this world was finiſhed, creeping things, as well as beaſts and cattle, had their appointment in the ſyſtem, and that ſmall people the Ants were ranked in the ſcale of beings. Creatures of a larger ſize may, perhaps, look down with contempt upon this pigmy race of inſects, but the uſefullneſs of beings is not to be determined from the quantity of matter they carry about with them, but from their works of wiſdom, and their fulfiling their appointment in the univerſal ſyſtem.

In the days of *Oeacus* we are informed by ancient fable, that when a peſtilence had carried off all the people, Jupitur, at the deſire of this ſage, formed a new race of men out of the family of Ants. This would ſeem to hint, that there is ſome relation between the Ants and the human race, or at leaſt that the ancients did not think it any diſcredit to men, to be compared to Piſmires. When I come to conſider the philoſophy of this people, I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew, how far they agree and differ from the human race. In the early periods of hiſtory, the Myrmidons were an eminent family among the Piſmires, and ſeem to have taken their deſignation from a chief Emmet of that name, from whom they are called Myrmidons. There were a people in Theſſaly, in the time of the Trojan war, of this name, who attended Achilles at the ſiege of Troy. There were fifty ſhips of Myrmidons commanded by this hero, according to Homer *.

Murmidones de Kaleunto kai Ellenes kai Achaioi,
Ton au Pentikonto neon en archos Achilleus.

Full fifty ſhips beneath Achilles' care
Th' Achaians, Myrmidons, Hellenians bare,
Theſſalians all, tho' various in their name,
The ſame their nation, and their chief the ſame. POPE.

There

* HOM. 684.

There is a fine deſcription of the Myrmidons in the 16th Book of Homer, when Patroclus led them on to battle *.

Hoi de hama Patroclo megaletori Thorechthentes
Eſtichon ophr' en Trooſi mega Phroneontes oruoſan,
Autica de ſphekeſſin Eoikates exeherhonto
Einodiois ous paides Eridmainouſin Ethontes.

The hoſt well arm'd, in ſteady ranks they go,
Patroclus leads them on to meet the foe,
Fierce on he paſt, and as the troops advance,
Keen of revenge, each warrior ſhakes his lance.
As waſps, provok'd by children, leave their hive,
And iſſue forth to ſave their young alive,
In thickeſt ſwarms they ruſh upon their foe;
Thus in cloſe ranks the Myrmidonians go;
And fiercely ruſh among the Trojan bands,
'Till heaps of ſlain lie ſcatter'd on the lands.

This authority may convince us, that the Piſmires are not an ignoble race, as men of the greateſt renown have taken their names from them, as far back as the ſiege of Troy. As Myrmidon appears to have been the firſt remarkable character among the Emmets, his hiſtory will not be unacceptable to the curious. The time of his nativity we will not pretend to aſſertain to a day, or an year, becauſe in the firſt ages of the world people were not ſo exact as they are now, with regard to chronology. But ſuppoſe we ſhould reckon the year of his nativity to have happened when *Cain* killed his brother *Abel*, there is nothing in either the *Hebrew*, *Chaldean*, or *Egyptian* hiſtory to contradict this opinion. It is not improbable that the Emmets were the firſt poſſeſſors of the land of Nod, and that Myrmidon was a native of that country. The country of *Homer*, of *Heſiod*, and *John Dunſcotus*, have all been diſputed, and people generally chooſe which ſide they think moſt probable, and ſo they may do with the preſent object of this hiſtory. There have been ſome who have thought, that there were people upon this earth before

* Hom. Iliad, L. xvi. 257.

before Adam, and that thoſe in the land of Nod were ſome of their poſterity; but as this has been accounted hereſy, it is dangerous to be *too poſitive* with regard to this point.

Myrmidon would, no doubt, have ſuch education as was cuſtomary in the country where he lived.—This is generally the firſt part of the hiſtory of remarkable perſonages, which we meet with in books of biography. Writers of lives ſeldom forget to inform us how many years their hero was at ſchool, how often he was flogged by his pedagogue, and how long time he took to learn *the alphabet*, *the grammar*, and *the claſſics*; what figure he made at *the Univerſity*. And whether he deſerved to be a *biſhop* or a *curate*, a *lord*, or a *'ſquire*. This is a part of our hero's hiſtory which I ſhall paſs over, as the memoirs of the family do not afford any light into theſe points. In the firſt ages of the world, before men's faculties were enfeebled by luxury and diſſipation; when they lived much in the fields and the open air, it is reaſonable to conclude, that they would perceive objects more eaſily, and more diſtinctly, than people have done ſince. They would then paſs more quickly from premiſes to concluſions, and ſcarcely perceive the middle term, which is now ſo eſſentially neceſſary to be conſidered before an argument is made.

As many writers of lives proceed *hypothetically* without being certain of the authenticity of the memoirs, from whence they take their informations. I hope, as this is a common pr vilege, it will be accounted no preſumption to make uſe of it. The memoirs of the Ants, like the prophecy of Enoch, which is ſaid to have been lately brought from ſome of the unfrequented tribes of Arabians, contains many curious anecdotes concering our ancient Piſmire.

He had from his early years an invincible inclination to travel, and before the univerſal deluge, had traverſed the greateſt part of the habitable world.

As

As he had a power of rendering himſelf inviſible to the human race, wherever he came, he had an opportunity of obſerving the actions, and learning their characters without being perceived. His firſt adventure was in the family of Cain, whether he came unperceived, when Jubal was compoſing muſic for the harp and organ, and Lamech was ſcolding with his two wives. He ſoon learned, by obſerving the laws that were given to mankind at firſt, that this diſagreement between Lamech and his wives was permitted by Providence as a puniſhment of his ſin for tranſgreſſing the firſt inſtitution of marriage; and that to take more wives than one, though it might be pretended that it was neceſſary for peopling the infant world, did not ſo much anſwer that end as was pretended. For as the number of men and women are nearly equal, when one man took two, it would be impoſſible for ſome men to have one, and it was therefore an arbitrary monopoly for Lamech to take two wives when it would be impoſſible for every other man to have the ſame number. This obſervation entirely deſtroys that apology which is made for the antidiluvian patriarch's living in pologamy, namely, that it was permitted, that the world might be ſooner overſpread with people; for it would have certainly been more conducive to that end, for every man to have one woman, than that ſome ſhould have had more; for as this was a perverſion of nature, it was not likely to anſwer any good purpoſe. Myrmidon made theſe obſervations upon pologamy while he continued in the family of Lamech of the poſterity of Cain.

This ancient Piſmire was endowed with another wonderful gift beſides the power of making himſelf inviſible; he could, by looking at the countenances of human creatures, ſee clearly into their hearts, and read the ſentiment of their minds. His obſervations upon the family of Lamech are curious and entertaining: In an ancient fragment, which he left behind him, and is ſtill preſerved in the family of

Myrmi-

Myrmidons, there are the following obſervations.—
" Lamech, as ſoon as he came to man's eſtate, loſt
" all ſenſe of the religion which his father Adam
" had introduced into his family, and became as
" great an infidel as Cain. The religious appoint-
" ments which had been introduced by divine au-
" thority, with regard to ſacrafices, and other me-
" thods of paying homage to the Deity, began to be
" totally neglected, and forms of human invention,
" more ſuited to the pride and corruption of nature,
" were ſubſtituted in their place. Lamech conſi-
" dered all religion as a mere policy, and practiſed
" it only as a means to obtain dominion over his
" family, whom he perſuaded of its importance *only*
" to ſerve his own ambition. He was naturally a
" man of a bluſtering diſpoſition, and wanted almoſt
" all that delicacy that reaſon dictates to men, as an
" ornament of their nature. When his wives and he
" happened to fall into varience, he would threaten
" them moſt ſeverely, and to frighten them, boaſt of
" actions he never had committed, and ſay, he had
" done what never was in his power. Murder he
" accounted no ſin, though, like Cain, he was really
" a coward, and affraid of every perſon he met.
" This is an ordinary conſequence of guilt and an ill
" conſcience, which generally make men either deſ-
" perate or cowardly. Humanity and real courage
" are ordinary united, and brave men are for the
" moſt part gentle and human. Lamech minded
" nothing ſo much as his ambition and his luſt.
" He was libidinous, and proud, yet mean in every
" ſtep of his conduct and behaviour. He was reſo-
" ſolute in nothing but when his luſt provoked him,
" and then he was mad like a bull in the herd, ready
" to deſtroy every rival that was his competitor for
" enjoyment. He never had any diſpoſition to fight,
" except when the ſpirit of gallantry moved him,
" or when he knew that he was in no danger, and
" and then he was inexorable, as all cowards gene-
" rally are.—But a determined look, and a threa-

" tening

" tening which appeared ſincere, would ſoon bring " him to the meaneſt ſubmiſſion, and ſhew that he " was only an *aſs* in a *lion's ſkin*. When his ſon " Jubal, who was a good-natured ſort of a man, " (as moſt part of thoſe who love muſic are) was " employed in compoſing muſic, to celebrate the " praiſes of the Almighty Creator, his father Lamech " was bluſtering with his wives, and turning his " ſon's compoſitions into ridicule,—of which the " following may be taken as a ſpecimen:

I.

" O thou great Creator! whom all things adore!
While we view thy great works, our ſouls love thee the more;
Thy great power and goodneſs thy works all proclaim,
And both ſun, moon, and ſtars, publiſh praiſe to thy name.

II.

" From a plant to a cedar thy preſence we trace,
And our ſouls view Jehovah thro' all infinite ſpace;
No atom ſo ſmall, nor a mountain ſo high,
But is ſeen by it's Maker, and obſerv'd by his eye.

III.

" In darkneſs thy all-ſeeing eye darts forth light,
No ſecrets at all ly conceal'd from thy ſight;
In deepeſt dark ſilence, if thy power thou diſplay,
Then night ſhines with all the effulgence of day.

IV.

" At thy nod all the orbs in their ſpheres whirl around,
Nor does motion and ſwiftneſs their order confound;
By thee taught their circles, they unerring roll on,
Yet no path is perceived when their ſubſtance is gone.

V.

" Even comets, whoſe circles no art e'er explor'd,
Unerring move on, and obey thee, O Lord!
They well know their ſeaſons and time to diſplay
Thy wiſdom: nor fail in a year, or a day.

VI.

" The Emmets, theſe ſmall and poor mean creeping things,
Thou deigns to regard, and provid'ſt them with wings:
And though weak and feeble by nature they are,
They live by thy goodneſs, and are fed by thy care.

Thy

VII.

" Thy works of creation in both earth and ſkies,
Confound all our wiſdom, fill our ſouls with ſurprize,
But when we behold thy rich mercy alone,
Our tongues are ſtruck dumb, and our language is gone.

VIII.

" Our ſouls in amazement and ſilence adore,
They fain would ſing praiſe but our words are no more;
We'll muſe then in raptures, and what words can't expreſs
Our ſouls ſhall admire, and our hearts ſhall confeſs."

There are ſome more ſtanzas in the ſame fragment, which ſhall be given in the remaining part of this life. The ſtory goes on—" When Jubal could " not live any longer with his father, and the ſons " of Cain, he left them, and went to the poſterity " of Seth, where he was kindly received, and joined " with them, when men began to call upon the name " of the Lord." A perſon, who is a lover of muſic, could not be unacceptable to ſuch as were ſincere worſhippers of the true God. Jubal therefore taught them muſic, and compoſed hymns in praiſe of the Almighty Creator of the univerſe. There is an excellent hymn upon ſacrifices, which, in the days of Enoch, was much admired, which is ſuppoſed to to have been written by Jubal, I have preſerved it entire, more on account of the ſentiments contained in it, than for its antiquity; but I ſhall proceed to the character of Jubal, not being diſpoſed to dwell long upon the character of his father, as all bad characters are diſagreeable to relate, and many of them had better be buried in oblivion, than be handed down to poſterity.

Jubal was an oppoſite character to that of his father; he was humane, hoſpitable, and benevolent; he loved good men, and performed good works.—That religion that was given to Adam by the Almighty, he endeavoured to obſerve, and was remarkably fond of that part of divine ſervice that related to the praiſe of his Maker. Whether this was a conſti-

THE MAGAZINE OF THE ANTS, OR PISMIRE JOURNAL.

PART IV.

The PHILOSOPHY *of the* ANTS, *ſince the Days of* SOLOMON.

THAT the Ants are philoſophers no perſon will diſpute who are acquainted with the hiſtory of that people. The plans of their cities declare that they underſtand geometry in a practical way, which is certainly the beſt ſort of knowledge. The doctrine of ſquares and angles appear to be well underſtood among them, and they are not ignorant of the doctrine of circles, as they can form a very exact one upon occaſions, when there is neceſſity for it. Whether they have learned proportion from the fifth book of Euclid I will not pretend to affirm, though I rather think that Euclid muſt have learned from them, as they are a more ancient people than the Greeks. As the practical geometry of this people agrees ſo well with the acknowledged principles of the beſt geometricians, they muſt be acknowledged to have true and juſt ideas of that part of the ſcience of mathematics. Their ſymbols are different from thoſe of the human race, and therefore it would be needleſs to pretend to give examples of their me-

thod of proceeding, in purſuing this ſcience. It is only neceſſary to appeal to their works of art, and eſpecially thoſe of geometry and architecture.—— Their manner of expreſſing themſelves is ſimple and eaſy; they avoid technical terms of art, by which perſons, unlearned in ancient languages, utter words they do not underſtand. They account it abſurd for a perſon of ſcience, who underſtands mathematics, to expreſs his art by words, which he does not know to what language they belong. And it muſt be allowed to be a diſgrace to ſcience to retain all thoſe foreign terms of art, when it may be more eaſily expreſſed in a people's own tongue. A equitaterai triangle might be called a figure of three equal ſides. A parallelogram a four ſided right lined figure, whoſe oppoſite ſides are equal. A parabola might be called the ſection of a cone, cut by a plane parallel to one of its ſides;—or, in geometry it may be called the quotient, which is now naturalized. A reformation of the ſtile in which the ſciences are written, is a thing much to be deſired, for the ſake of thoſe who are not inſtucted in the learned languages.

But it may be obſerved concerning the whole ſcience of mathematics and geometry, that, though ſome definitions may be inaccurately expreſſed, and many terms dark and obſcure, yet, as experiment calls forth every thing to a trial, there can be little danger concerning the meaning of words. The ſcience is an object of our ſenſes, in general, and there is no reaſon to fear, that there ever can be any material deception. There are ſaid to have been inſtances of perſons, who never could learn to read one ſyllable, who underſtood practical geometry, and who could form very noble deſigns, which ſhews that ſcience does not ſo much conſiſt in words as in ſentiments of the mind.

The method of reaſoning in the mathematics, is the ſame with that which is called logical, only with this difference, that the objects of the firſt are, for

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the moſt part viſible, and may be examined by our ſenſes, and brought to the trial of experiment, but the others are objects of reaſon, and can only be tried by the mind. There are ſome things in the mathematics which are not objects of our ſenſes, ſuch as *axioms* and *definitions*, which are deductions of reaſon, and can never be perceived otherwiſe than by the mind. They are mere abſtract ideas that inhere in no viſible ſubject; of this ſort are theſe, *that a point hath no parts*, *Semeion eſtin ou meros outhen*. According to Euclid. *That a line is length, without breadth or thickneſs*——*That lines are made up of points*——*Superfices of lines, and ſolids of ſuperfices*. All theſe are mere abſtract ideas taken for granted, of which no man's mind had ever any architypes. This teaches us, that, without firſt applying to reaſon, that we could not even arrange objects of ſenſe ſcientifically, and that our mind is more the governor of our ſenſes, than our ſenſes of our mind. It is alſo plain, that all viſible objects, to which philoſophical experiments are applied, are made ſubject to axioms that lie beyond the reach of any experiment. There is no experiment in the whole compaſs of mechanical philoſophy that can demonſtrate any of the forementioned axioms.—They muſt even be taken for granted and are mere logical definitions.

It is, perhaps, uncertain whether, without admitting the definitions and axioms in Euclid, any mathematician could demonſtrate any of his propoſitions. If the negative be true, it will perhaps be eaſy to prove that other doctrines of philoſophy may be brought to demonſtration, as well as the mathematics, without any diſgrace to that ſcience. Suppoſe a Piſmire ſhould reaſon in this manner. That as the mind forms inviſible ſtandards of truth, to which ſhe brings all viſible objects to be tried, may ſhe not, by theſe maxims of reaſon, or ſimilar ones, try all objects whatſoever?—And if the objects of the mind do not agree with the axioms of reaſon,

ought they not to be determined to be falſe? or if they agree with them, ought they not to be accounted true and certain? Since the mind can form axioms and definitions in themſelves inviſible, to be the baſis of viſible truths, why may ſhe not judge of thoſe things that are the objects of reaſon, by the ſame rules? If the principles be true and admitted, and the reaſoning juſt, ought not the concluſion to be received as certain truth in the one caſe, as well as another? If things of equal qualities be equal, are not things that are equally right or wrong equal? Have not our minds as diſtinct perceptions of what is right or wrong, as they have of oppoſite *quantities* or *qualities* of bodies? The qualities of bodies will admit of as much diſputation as the properties in things good or evil, and if we do not admit of ſome firſt-principles in both caſes, the diſpute will never be ended, and an everlaſting ſceptiſm will be introduced. Does any body doubt that twice two are equal to four? As little can they doubt that moral good is to be preferred to moral evil, or pleaſure is to be preferred to pain, when no other conſideration comes in the way. There are caſes in which twice two are not equal to four, they are only numerically ſo, but may, in other reſpects, be very different; as the degrees of good and evil, pleaſure and pain, and their reaſons may be. But if we do not admit of ſome ſtandard of reaſoning, nothing ever can be determined, and mathematics, as well as other ſciences, may be called in queſtion; for, provided the firſt principles are not true, the whole muſt be conſidered as erroneous. It is not eaſy to ſee how this reaſoning of the Piſmire can be confuted.

By proceeding in this manner, moral truths may be demonſtrated, as well as thoſe that relate to other ſciences, and our minds be confirmed in the truths of morality as well as thoſe of the mathematics. The method of proceeding in this ſcience will be conſidered as we purſue the philoſophy of

the

the Ants; and diſtinct chapters upon every head ſhall be given, that every particular may be diſtinctly perceived and underſtood.—But, for the ſake of order, the inſtrumental part of their philoſophy ſhall be conſidered,—next the practical part, thirdly, their natural hiſtory and phyſics,—and, laſtly, an account of the practice of anatomy and phyſic among that people. Philoſophy literally ſignifies, the love of wiſdom, but it is ſcientifically conſidered, as the knowledge of all truth and goodneſs, calculated to render people happy, and truely uſeful, and ſocial creatures. There is a part of this univerſal ſcience which is called logic, or inſtrumental philoſophy, which prepares the human underſtanding for the reception of truth. This, in the firſt place, inſtructs us in the operations of our own minds, and the method how to apply theſe operations to inveſtigating of truth.

Whether there be as much truth in the old logic of the ſchools, as has been long pretended, it is not of much conſequence to diſpute on this occaſion.—The generality of philoſophers have affirmed, that there are three operations of the mind in inveſtigating truth, which they call *perception*, *judgment*, and *reaſoning*. The firſt happens when a ſingle object or idea enters the mind.—The ſecond when two ideas are compared between themſelves.—And the third when the mind compares two *objects*, or *ideas*, with a *third*, as a *middle term*. This laſt is a proceſs of the ſame kind with the rule of three in arithmetic, as ſhall be ſhewn afterwards. Perception is not, in every caſe, an operation of the mind, but a feeling. There are objects which our minds perceive, without uſing any active power, which perception, ariſes from no operation of the ſoul; of this ſort are *involuntary pain*, and *averſion*. Theſe are ſometimes moſt painful perceptions, which the mind does not receive by any operation, and cannot reſiſt by any of her powers or faculties. *Sympathy* and *antipathy*, cannot be comprehended under any rules of ſchool

logic.

logic. Therefore when we call perception *an operation of the mind*, it muſt be underſtood, when ſhe is active in perceiving.

An operation implies ſome work or action of the ſoul concerning an object, and when ſhe perceives either a preſent object, or remembers its paſt exiſtence, theſe are both *perceptions*, and may be alſo called *actions*, or *operations*. I perceived a book yeſterday, I remember it to-day; the latter is no more than the recalling of the former and is only a repetition of the ſame perception. There is a power or faculty in the human mind which is not admitted in the common philoſophy, and yet ſeems to be the moſt original of any that man is poſſeſſed of. And that is the power of analyſing objects to come to the knowledge of their true characters. As far back as we can remember, we have the idea of compoſition, or of variety in the ſame object; for a child, as ſoon as it can take notice of any thing, will not be ſatisfied till it view an object on all ſides, and behaves as if it expected ſomething new in the thing that is the object of its ſenſes. Put a bundle of rods into the hand of a child of three years of age, though it appears to be but one thing, you will ſoon perceive it endeavour to looſe the bundle, and examine its contents, and then attempt to arrange them according to ſome proportion that is between them. This ſhews, that there is a diſpoſition in the child to find out the nature of the object, by analyſing it. If there was no more than a ſimple perception in the mind of the child, it would not expect to find any thing more in the object than mere unity, and would not proceed till it ſaw another of the ſame ſort or one different; but, inſtead of this, it examines the object to find variety, and acquires the knowledge of truth by experience. It is much to be doubted, if there are any ſuch thing in nature as ſimple perception, or the viewing of an object, ſo as to furniſh only one ſimple idea. The perceptions of colours, ſounds, and ſmell, are generally accounted

ſimple

ſimple perceptions, but, upon examination, it will be found, that they are far otherwiſe. This ſhall be the ſubject of a chapter by itſelf. At preſent it may be obſerved, that we often deceive ourſelves by conceiving, that we have ſimple notions of things, when they really are compounded of a vaſt variety of different objects, and may all be analyſed. It is, in this caſe, as in a natural analyſis of bodies, there are very few, if any thing, ſimple, in the whole ſyſtem of nature. All things are ſo united, that, to make a ſeparation totally, appears to be impoſſible.

Too much nicety in philoſophizing, has, in all ages, been hurtful to true philoſophy. By diſputing about what was of no conſequence, whether it was true or falſe, men have frequently waſted much time, without attaining to any real knowledge, and what is worſe, have created diſcords that have not been eaſily removed. There is a great difference between taking things for granted without any ſhadow of proof, and diſputing all proofs and evidence whatſoever. It is as unreaſonable to refuſe true evidence, as it is to believe without it. Vanity, and a love of being ſingular, have made ſome men advance the moſt ſhocking paradoxes, that have been a diſgrace to philoſophy, and matter of endleſs diſpute to philoſophers. As if the Deity had deſigned continually to deceive us, ſome have affirmed, that there is no truth nor certainty in the evidence of our ſenſes,—and that a ſtone is not heavy, nor a feather light, that there is no heat in fire, nor cold in ice,—that there is no ſmell in a roſe, nor any taſte in honey. But that all theſe are mere ideas independent upon any real qualities in bodies. From whence it follows, that there is no heat in fire, nor cold in ice, but when they are felt,—that there is no ſmell in a roſe, nor ſweetneſs in honey, except when they are in contact with ſome of our feelings. This ſort of wrangling may divert a man in his ſtudy, the ſame way that a gew-gaw and a rattle may pleaſe a child, but can produce no true wiſdom

or real knowledge. Philoſophic knowledge is attained by ſlow, yet by ſure ſteps To be precipitate in drawing concluſions, before the principles are examined, is a raſhneſs, detrimental to philoſophy, but when the principles are inveſtigated, and found evident, not to draw a concluſion, is weak and puſillanimous. Sceptics, though they appear exceedingly cautious in admitting of evidence in favour of realities, have yet been very poſitive in affirming, that nothing is certain. This is inconſiſtent with their own principles; for how can they be certain that nothing is certain, ſeeing all things are involved in perpetual uncertainty? No ſooner do we depart from the rules of common ſenſe, than we ceaſe to be philoſophers.

I hope, in purſuing the philoſophy of the Ants, to ſhew that there is a rational and certain method of philoſophizing —which gives pleaſure, and affords certainty concerning thoſe things that it treats of.—

What has introduced the greateſt confuſion in Philoſophy is, the diſpoſition of men to be too ſceptical, or too dogmatical; both of which are extremes unworthy of true philoſophy. Many run ſo haſtily from one thing to another, on account that they take all things for granted, that they embrace falſehood inſtead of truth, and hold it firmly, becauſe they are unwilling to expoſe their ignorance; and others are ſo ill to pleaſe with regard to evidence, that no proofs, whatſoever, can pleaſe them. Even their own ſenſes, that they have found for many years faithful in bearing teſtimomy concerning objects, they condemn, as unworthy to be truſted in the moſt trifling matters. All this proceeds from mere wantonneſs, and is unworthy of a philoſopher. The reaſons of ſcepticiſm at large, will be given in the ſequel of this work, at preſent it is only neceſſary to obſerve, that doubting there is proof to exclude all doubt, is as much ſuperſtition as unreaſonable credulity, and it argues as much weakneſs to reject good proofs, as to give credit without them.

THE MAGAZINE OF THE ANTS, OR PISMIRE JOURNAL.

PART V.

The MUSIC *of the* ANTS, *&c.*

MUSIC is one of the ſeven ſciences, and is juſtly admired by all people of a fine taſte, and who love the liberal arts. A man who has no taſte for muſic, is deſtitute of a feeling, which, we are informed, will be in high eſtimation in another ſyſtem. The want of a taſte for muſic is a ſign of a babarous diſpoſition, and thoſe who are not affected with its charms, are, in character, ſomething below the beaſts of the field. A taſte for this art does not imply that a perſon is an actual performer upon an inſtrument, or that he is a good ſinger: both judgment and taſte for muſic may be where the power of the organs that are neceſſary for execution are a wanting. A perſon may have a bad voice, and yet be delighted with a good ſong, and be a good judge of ſinging; he may be pleaſed with a tune upon the *violin* or *harpſicord*, and yet not be able to perform upon either of theſe inſtruments. But ſuch as have an averſion to muſic are perſons that few would chooſe to keep company with. You will ſeldom

find a lover of this fine art, provided he is not depraved by bad company, and has contracted evil habits, but is a good natured fellow. It was by means of this liberal art, that ancient legiſlators reformed and cultivated the manners of the rude multitude. The fable of Orpheus making the woods follow him, on account of his muſic, is no more than an allegory, intimating, that, by the inſtrumentality of muſic, he rendered a wild people tractable, and poliſhed their manners.

Of all languages whatſoever, that of muſic is the the moſt univerſal; and thoſe who do not underſtand one another's ſpeech, can yet underſtand their muſic, with great exactneſs, and practiſe it at firſt ſight. It is not certain whether this has been the caſe from the beginning of the world, or not, becauſe there are but few accounts of the forms of muſic, and muſical inſtruments, in our moſt ancient hiſtory. Jubal was the firſt inventor of muſic, ſome time before the flood, but it is not eaſy to determine of what ſort his compoſitions were. That example of poetry given by Moſes, which he attributes to Lamech, is much of the ſame kind with that which has been practiſed among people in all ages, and from hence I would infer, that the muſic which his ſon compoſed, was much of the ſame ſort with what prevailed in the world afterwards. It does not appear very evident, that the inſtruments of muſic in the days of Jubal were of the ſame form with thoſe that are now called by the ſame name in modern times. The organ and harp, mentioned by Moſes *Gen.* iv. 21. were probably both ſtringed inſtruments, and none of them reſembled that inſtrument which, among us, has received the name of an *organ*. It is hardly to be ſuppoſed, that an inſtrument of ſuch a complication of parts, was at firſt underſtood by the ancients; or that the jewiſh organ was in any reſpect like to an Engliſh one.

The *cinnor*, and *ugab* in the days of Jubal appear to have been inſtruments made for playing love

ſongs

ſongs, for the *latter* word ſignifies literally *a love ſong*, or a compoſition in poetry, ſet to muſic, upon the ſubject of love. The firſt poetry that hiſtory informs us of, was compoſed to a different ſubject by Lamech, probably out of contempt of his ſon's muſic, when he was out of humour with the behaviour of his wives. But whatever may be in this, it is plain, that poetry and muſic have been much the ſame from the very early periods of the world. That ſpecimen of Lamech's poetry which Moſes has given, is far from being of the loweſt kind, though ſpoken upon a very ſtrange occaſion.

Shemaan Koli neſe, Lamek haſenna immarti,
Ce-iſh har geti lepiſti, vegeled le haburati.

Which may be expreſſed thus in Engliſh.

Attend *ye wives*, and while I ſpeak *take head*,
What Lamech utters *all this houſe may dread*;
Or *young*, or old, or were he *friend*, or *foe*,
Who me provokes, *this arm ſhall bring him low*.

There is little more ſaid concerning muſic in the firſt book of Moſes, from the times of Jubal till the days of the patriarch Jacob, when we have an account of *tabert* and *harp*, joined with ſinging, *Gen.* xxxi. 27. By this time muſic had become univerſal in Syria, and was practiſed on all occaſions of feſtivity, eſpecially at marriages. What the tabert was, is not ſo eaſily underſtood. The word *toph* ſignifies a *drum*, made of braſs or metal, of which we are not ſure if there is any ſuch now in uſe among us.

It does not appear that there was any muſical inſtruments made uſe of among the Hebrews in the days of Moſes, except trumpets and timbrels. The firſt of theſe was hardly conſidered as a muſical inſtrument, but was rather uſed to call the people to an aſſembly, or ſound an alarm for battle. The ſound of the trumpet was ordinarily attended with the ſhouting of the people, which makes it evident, that it was not conſidered as properly a muſical inſtrument.

The difference between the *ugab* and *cinnor* among the Hebrews ſeems to have been, that the firſt was better calculated for playing *ſoft tunes*, than the latter, and was made uſe of, to expreſs the tender affections of the mind; whereas the latter was uſed to ſtir up the more manly feelings, and to rouſe the paſſions of *friendſhip*, *fortitude*, and *reſolution*.—— It is not improbable, that the harp which was uſed by Jubal might be of the ſame kind with that which was in uſe in ancient Thebes, and that the latter might be an imitation of the former. A copy of this harp, as drawn by *Mr Bruce*, and publiſhed in *Dr Burney's Hiſtory of Muſic*. [the reader may ſee it on the oppoſite page] We may, probably, have occaſion, in the courſe of this work, to give our readers a view of many inſtruments of muſic among the ancients, and point out their various uſes in *religion*, *marriages*, *times of feſtivity*, and *war*, Theſe ſhall be given according to the times in which they were uſed, and will fall in of courſe in this part of the Magazine of the Ants.

As the government of the community of Emmets has not been altered from the beginning of the world, it is natural to ſuppoſe, that their arts and ſciences have been uninterrupted, and, of conſequence, have been brought to a ſtate of greater perfection, than in many human communities, which have been ſo often changed and altered in the courſe of time, and the viſciſitudes of ſociety.

Muſic and poetry are kindred arts, or rather the very ſame art differently expreſſed, and as they are ſo nearly allied, it will be neceſſary to conſider them both as connected and as they are diſtinct. Muſic may be without poetry, for proſe will ſet to muſic as well as verſe; but it will be impoſſible to compoſe fine poetry without ſome idea of muſic. The ſound and the ſentiment agree ſome way naturally, and without knowing when we unite them we gene- make them go together. In bad poetry this is the caſe, as well as in *ſublime* and *lofty* ſongs. Low and grovling



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grovling ſentiments are generally expreſſed by words in themſelves, as inſignificant as the ideas that they are uſed to expreſs; or if high ſwelling words are uſed to expreſs a *baſe* ſentiment, they are at *beſt* but *words of vanity*. To ſhew what ideas the Ants have of ſimplicity in their ſongs in times of feſtivity, I ſhall preſent the reader with one, which we ſhall ſuppoſe was compoſed during the time of an election of a member of parliament, for to repreſent them in the great council, and ſung over a bowl after dinner, at one of their meetings.

An ANTS' SONG.

I.

To freedom we ſing,
And may God ſave the king;
Our laws and our rights to defend:
For when liberty's gone,
Down tumbles the throne,
Our glory is then at an end.

II.

Wiſe heaven, becauſe
Our freedom and laws
Are firmly cemented together,
Made the king on the throne
And the people all one,
By a mutual compact for ever.

III.

We brethren are all,
Both the great and the ſmall,
True love is the bond of our union;
And while we agree
In love, to be free,
There is nothing can break our communion.

IV.

Court ſycophants may
Seek our cauſe to betray,
And ſend idle tales to the throne:
But we'll let them all ſee,
We love to be free,
And prove king and people are one.

V.

He's a traitor in ſoul,
I ſwear by this bowl,
Who loves not his country and king;
Regards not the laws,
And fair liberty's cauſe,
Or ſays they are not the ſame thing.

VI.

The ocean, though wide,
Cannot true friends divide;
For in this all good ſubjects agree,
That from centre to pole,
'Tis the voice of the whole,
To obey king and laws, and be free.

VII.

The Ants, one and all,
Though a people but ſmall,
Have hearts that are faithful and true,
They dread not the ſword,
When freedom's the word,
Nor death, when hung up to their view.

VIII.

They all love their king,
And jointly do ſing,
May rogues be remov'd from his throne,
May the laws have their courſe,
While freedom's no worſe,
And may the king and his people be one.

This is a plain, ſimple, and unartificial ſong, where the ſentiments come from the heart, and are expreſſed as they naturally ariſe, with great ſimplicity. There are many election ſongs in England not much better than this ſonnet of our poetical Piſmire. It is true, there are no *gods* or *goddeſſes* invoked in it, but this proceeds from there being no occaſion for them, and becauſe the Ants never call upon any divinity but when they intend devotion. It is not the practice among them, as in England, to ſwear by the *name of God* when they ſing over a bowl; for they have no word in their language that can

can expreſs a profane oath. When they uſe expletives, they are generally the names of things preſent, that do not imply calling any inviſible power to witneſs the truth or falſehood of what they ſay. In their love ſongs they never call upon *Cupid* or *Venus* to aſſiſt them, and yet there are ſeveral odes compoſed by their poets upon the ſubject of love, that have conſiderable merit.

The May, an *Ant's love ſong*, in the manner of the ancient ſhepherds, ſhall be given as a ſpecimen.

I.

When firſt I ſaw Cloe it was in ſweet May,
When the fields they were green, and all nature was gay;
With a glance of her eye, far more quick than a dart,
She pierced my breaſt, and fix'd love in my heart.

II.

I ſoon felt a flame, which I knew not before,
I ſought for relief but was ſtill pain'd the more,
I could not tell what was the cauſe of my woe,
But oft in my ſleep I was heard to cry Clo'.

III.

My ſheep I forſook, and my crook threw away,
My lambs left to wander, my flocks went aſtray;
While penſive I roam'd o'er the hills to find eaſe,
But all was in vain, nought but Cloe could pleaſe,

IV.

The daiſies that ſpangled the pleaſant mead o'er,
The lawns and the land-ſkips *my darling* before;
The gales all perfum'd with ſweet ordours in May,
Could afford me no pleaſure, when Cloe was away.

V.

The rills that deſcend from the mountains ſo high,
The ſweet purling ſtreams that ſo gently glide by,
The ſtill murmuring brook, with its banks freſh any gay,
Could afford me no pleaſure when Cloe was away.

VI.

The warbling blythe thruſh ſung his notes on the ſpray,
The ſky-lark hail'd Phœbus the bright king of day!
The choir in the grove, and the lambs on the leas,
Strove all to delight me, but 'twas Cloe could pleaſe.

O'er

VII.

O'er the plain, at a diſtance, I ſpy'd my ſweet maid,
I ran ſwift, and met her, and ſoftly thus ſaid:—
Dear Cloe be kind, or your poor ſwain will die,
She ſeem'd for to whiſper, my dear Sir, not I.

VIII.

I preſs'd a warm kiſs to her lips, with ſome fear,
While from her bright eyes trickl'd down a kind tear:
I kiſs'd it away, and could only ſay *Cloe!*
Your beauty gives pain, but your love can give joy.

IX.

She ſaid not a word, but her eyes ſpoke her mind,
She ſeem'd for to ſmile, *I believ'd* ſhe was kind;
At laſt ſhe broke ſilence, and *whiſpering*, repli'd,—
Your Cloe conſents that ſhe will be your bride.

X.

My flocks that were ſcattered, my ſheep that were ſtray'd
I ſoon gather'd in;—where my ſheep-crook was laid
I quickly diſcover'd, and ſeiz'd it with joy;
And there's none now ſo happy as *Damon* and *Cloe*.

XI.

With my pipe on the banks of the brook now I play,
The ſtreams they delight me, the fields all ſeem gay:
While Cloe ſits by me, all the birds in the grove
Chirp ſweetly,—and all that they ſing of is love.

There is no prayers to *Venus* or *Cupid* in this ſonnet, and yet the ideas are *natural* and *ſoft*, expreſſive both of true love, and true modeſty, which are the beſt ornaments of love ſongs. That ſpecies of poetry, which borders upon laſciviouſneſs is unknown in the kingdom of Ants. No Piſmire can endure to hear *luſcious* ſongs, or *immodeſt* converſation. This proceeds partly from the manner of their *education*, and partly from their *temperance* in *eating* and *drinking*. Their paſſions are not inflamed by the force of appetite, and therefore they are the more eaſily kept ſubject to reaſon. In all their poetry there is not one Bachanalian ſong; for they never drink to exceſs, as is the practice in Britain.

THE GRAMMAR OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE ANTS.

THE word *Grammar* among the *Ants*, ſignifies, *the right method* of *ſpeaking* or *writing* any language.

Grammar has four parts,—*Pronunciation*, *Spelling*, *Derivation and Syntax*.

The Ants proceed nearly in forming their language, according to the cuſtom of the place where they have their reſidence. But we ſhall conſider the grammar of Engliſh Ants, and ſhew where they agree and differ with mankind in the principal parts of grammar.

PART I.

Concerning Pronunciation.

M. WHAT is a letter?

S. It is a mark that ſuggeſts an articulate ſound.

M. How many letters are there among the Ants?

S. Twenty-ſix, as in Engliſh; *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, *h*, *i*, *j*, *k*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *o*, *p*, *q*, *r*, *s*, *t*, *u*, *v*, *w*, *x*, *y*, *z*.

M. How are theſe divided?

S. Into vowels and conſonants.

M. How many vowels are there?

S. Five; *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*.

M. What

M. What is a vowel?

S. A vowel is an articulate ſound, expreſſed by one impulſe of the breath.

M. Are there any real ſounds in letters?

S. No. They only bring articulate ſounds to our remembrance, as notes of muſic do to thoſe who ſing or play.

M. Is there any ſimilitude between the marks called letters, and the ſound ſuggeſted by them?

S. None at all; for the one is an object of ſight, and the other of hearing.

M. Is there any difference between the names and the ſounds of letters?

S. Certainly; the names of all the conſonants are different from their ſounds.

M. Have conſonants any ſounds at all?

S. Yes, all of them have ſome ſound, and all the liquids have diſtinct ſounds, though not ſo open as vowels.

M. How do you prove that liquids have diſtinct ſounds?

S. From their being capable of being ſounded through the whole ſcale of muſic, as well as vowels.

M. What is meant by a conſonant?

S. A letter ſounded with a vowel.

M. How many conſonants are there?

S. All the reſt are called conſonants except the five vowels. They are in number twenty-one.

Concerning VOWELS.

M. How many ſounds have vowels?

S. Generally two, a ſhort and a long.

M. May not theſe be varied?

S. Yes; by the help of accents they may be raiſed in their tone, or depreſſed in their ſound.

Concerning the Letter a.

M. How many ſounds has the letter *a*?

S. Two, a ſhort, and a long.

M. Has

M. Has not *a* a broad ſound alſo?

S. Yes; but this is a variation of its long ſound, occaſioned by the conſonants that it is joined with.

M. When muſt *a* be ſounded ſhort?

S. In all words of one ſyllable, wish a conſonant, as *bat*, *cat*, *can*, *mad*, &c.

2. In words of more ſyllables than one, where two conſonants meet, as in *batter*, *cannot*, *farrier*, &c. 3. In words where a ſingle conſonant is pronounced double, as in *balance*, *baniſh*, *dragon*, *habit*, &c.

M. When is *a* pronounced long?

S. In all words of one ſyllable where *e* ſilent ends the word, as *make*, *take*, *fate*, *late*, *babe*, *glade*, &c. 2. *A* is ſounded long in words of many ſyllables, when it ends a ſyllable; as in *cradle*, *ladle*, *contemplation*, *conſideration*, *vexation*, &c.

M. When is *a* ſounded broad?

S. 1. *A* is ſounded broad beforr *ll* in the words *all*, *call*, *ſhall*, *tall*, *wall*, and words derived from them, as *although*, *calling*, *tallneſs*, *wallflower*, *walnut*, &c. 2. Before *ld* and *lk*; as *bald*, *ſcald*, *ſtalk*, *talk*, *walk*, *malt*, *ſalt*, &c. 3. Between *w*, and *r*, as in *war*, *warren*, *ward*, *warm*, *warn*, and words derived from them. 4. Before *tch*, *ſh*, and *th*; as in *match*, *ſnatch*, *waſh*, *wrath*, &c. Note *a* is ſounded broad in many polyſyllables, as in *batchelor*, *maſter*, *maſterly*, &c.

M. Is *a* ſounded at the end of any proper Engliſh Piſmire words?

S. No. There are only ſeven words that end in *ea*; and *ea* ſound as *e* long; as *lea*, *flea*, *plea*, *ſea*, *tea*, *yea*, and *pea*.

Concerning the Letter e.

This letter *e* which is the *fifth* of the alphabate, and the *ſecond vowel*, is more uſed than any other letter in the alphabate of the Engliſh Ants. It has a *ſhort* and a *long* ſound, which are varied, according as the vowel is connected with *certain conſonants*.

M. When

M. When is *e* ſounded ſhort?

S. It is ſounded ſhort in all words and ſyllables, ending in a *ſingle* or *double conſonants*, as *bed*, *den*, *help*, *let*, *fret*, *helm*, *hemp*, *bent*, *kept*, *herd*, *herb*, *length*, *ſtrength*, *letter*, *better*.

M. When is *e* pronounced long?

S. 1. In words of one ſyllable, having *e* ſilent at the end, as *glebe*, *glede*, *here*, *ſcene*, and others of the ſame kind. 2. *E* ought to have its long ſound in *there*, *were*, *where*, though theſe words are viciouſly pronounced with the long ſound of *a*. 3. *E* is ſounded long in many compound words, ſuch as *adhere*, *auſtere*, *apozeme*, *blaſpheme*, *cohere*, *complete*, and many others *. 4. *E* is ſounded long when it is joined with *a*, or *i*, to form a diphthong, as in *arrear*, *appear*, *bead*, *beaſt*, *ceaſe*, *conceive*, *deceit*, *believe*, *atchievement*, *thieves*, *yield*, *bleed*, *creed*, &c. 5. *E*, in foreign words, is ſounded long in the end, as *Phebe*, *Penelope*, *Paſiphae*, *Xantippe*, *&c.* 6. It is ſounded long in the words *he*, *ſhe*, *me*, *we be*, and *ye*. In moſt of other words *e* final has no ſound of its own.

M. What letters are ſubſtituted at the end of words to ſupply the place of *e*?

S. Y, as *holy*, *happy*, *ſteady*, &c. 2. *Ie*, as in *gypſie*, *buſie*, which are now changed into *y*, as *eaſy*, *buſſy*. 3. *Ey*, as *honey*, *money*, *key*, &c. 4. By *ee*, as *bee*, *knee*, *Pharaſee*, *ſeducee*, & c.

M. What is the uſe of *e* final?

S. It is uſed to ſhew, that the foregoing vowel, or diphthong, is to be ſounded long, as *made*, *mete*, *bite*, *tune*, *lace*, *race*, *bathe*, *ſheathe*, &c. *E* is always written after *c* and *g* in the middle of a word, unleſs follow it, as *advancement*, *encouragement*; but *vicious*, *judgment*, § &c. are excepted, becauſe *i* comes after, and *d* comes before *g*. *E* is ſilent in the laſt ſyllable of *even*, *eleven*, *ſeven*, *heaven*, and ſuch like words.

5 DE 88

Con-

* *Complete* is often ſpelled *compleat*, with many other compounds.

§ *Judgment* is ſometimes written with *e* in the firſt ſyllable.

A DICTIONARY, AND CONCORDANCE, &c.

A A

A, is the firſt letter in the alphabet of every known language, except the Ethiopic: it has three variations in pronunciation, namely, a broad, an open, and a ſlender pronunciation.

A broad, is ſounded like *au*, in *all*, *ball*, *call*, &c.

A open, is found in *father*, *rather*.

A ſlender, is found in *pace*, *race*, *chace*.

A ſhort, as in *cat*, *rat*: and long, as in *graze*, *glaze*, &c. which is generally ſignified by *e* final, as in *plane*, or *i* after it as in *plain*.

A is uſed for *any*, as, *a* man talks of peace or war.

A is a partiele of the ſingular number, as, he is *a* man; before a vowel it takes *n* after it, as, the hen laid *an* egg; as alſo before *h*, as. *An* honeſt man's the nobleſt work of God.

Except when *h* is ſounded itſelf, in which caſe the *n* is omitted, as,

A horſe, *a* horſe, *a* kingdom for *a* horſe.

A, is alſo uſed for *each*, as the wages o *a* ſoldier is ſixpence *a* day.

A, before a participle is uſed for the infinitive mood, he went *a* hunting, namely *to hunt*. Sometimes it is uſed for *at*, both when applied to place or actions, as Thomas *a* Becket, for *at* Becket: he was *a* walking when the poſt came away.

A, ſometimes changes ſubſtantives into adverbs, when prefixed to them, as, *aſleep*, *aſide*, *aſlope* &c.

A, is ſometimes redundant in the beginning of words, as, *ariſe*, *awake*, for *riſe*, *wake*, &c. and in the end of words in burliſque poetry, as,

Jog on, Jog on the foot-path way,
And merrily hind the ſtile *a*;
a merry heart goes all the day,
Your ſad tires in a mile *a*.

A, is uſed in abreviations, for *artium*, *anno*, *anſwer*; or in *antient marbles*, or *medels*, for *Auguſtus*, *ager*, *ainſ*

aiunt.; when double, *augusti*, when triple, *auro*, *augento*, *ære*; on the reverse of ancient medals it shews they were struck at *Argos*, or *Athens*. Among merchants, it is set alone after a bill of exchange, it signifies *accepted*, and is also used to distinguish the sets of accounts instead of a figure; thus, *a*, *b*, *c*, are instead of 1, 2, 3.

A, or aa, is used by physicians instead of *ana*, and denotes that the proportion of ingredients should be equal.

A, in music, is that note that lies between the second and third line in the treble, or upon the top of the fifth line of the bass.

A, among the Romans, was used as a numerical letter, and stands for 500; when it has a dash over it, it stands for 5000.

A, among logicians, denotes an universal affirmative proposition, according to the old verse.

Asserit *a* negat e verum totaliter ambæ.

A, A, A, in chemistry, signifies amalgama, amalgamation, a mixture of metals and quicksilver.

AAM, *s.* a measure in the low countries, which, when filled with water, weighs 288 pounds.

AB, *s.* [Heb.] the eleventh month of the civil, and the fifth of the ecclesiastical year of the Jews.

AB, at the beginning of English Saxon names, is generally a contraction of Abbot, or Abby, and denotes they either had an abby, or belonged to one.

ABACA, *s.* an Indian plant in the Phillipine islands.

ABACK, *adv.* bockwards.

ABACOT, *s.* a cap of state, worn by our English kings, wrought in the form of a crown.

ABACTED, *adj.* [Lat.] a law term, signifying, driven away by violence or stealth.

ABACTORS, *s.* [Lat.] in law, those that steal and drive away whole herds of cattle, the same with Abigei.

ABACUS, *s.* [Lat.]

1. a cupboard.
2. a counting table.
3. The upper part of the capital of a column, which serves as a crown both to the capital, and whole collumn, especially in the Corinthian order.

ABACUS PITHAGORICUS, the multiplication table; so called from its inventor, Pythagoras.

ABACUS LOGISTICUS, a right angled triangle, whose sides forming the right angle, contain the numbers from one to sixty; and its area the product of each two of the numbers, perpendicularly opposite: it is also known by the name of a Canon of sexagesimals.

ABAFT, *adv.* a sea term, signifying towards the stern.

ABAISANCE, *s.* [Fr.] an act of respect or courtesy.

ABALIANATION, *s.* a term in the old Roman law, signifying a simple sale of the goods of one citizen to another.

To ABALINATE, *v. a.* [Lat.] to give up ones right to another.

To ABAND, *v. a.* it is used by Spencer for Abandon.

To ABANDON, *v. a.* [Fr.] to forsake, to desert, to give up.

ABANDONED, *adj.*

1. Forsaken, deserted.
2. Given up, resigned.
3. Corrupted in the highest degree. It is applied to all persons who live loosely, and are desipated in an extreme.

ABANDONMENT, *s.*

1. The art of abandoning.
2. The state of the abandoned.

ABANDUM, *s.* a law term, signifying any thing sequestered, or confiscated.

ABANET,

ABANET, *ſ.* [Heb.] a kind of girdle worn by the Jewiſh prieſts.

ABANITION, *ſ.* [Lat.] a baniſhment of one for two years for manſlaughter.

ABAPISTON, *ſ.* [Gr.] a ſurgical inſtrumeut uſed in the operation of the trepan.

ABARCY, *ſ.* [Sax.] inſatiableneſs. (Out of uſe.)

To ABARE, *v. a.* [Sax.] to uncover.

To ABARNARE, *v. a.* a law term ſignifying to inform, or diſcover a ſecret to a magiſtrate.

ABARTICULATION, *ſ.* [Lat.] that ſpecies of articulation which has manifeſt motion.

ABAS, a weight for pearls uſed in Perſia.

To ABASE, *v. a.* [Fr.] to caſt down, to depreſs. It is uſed in ſcripture,

Job. xl. 11. Behold every one proud and *abaſe* him.

Iſa. xxxi. 4. The lion will not *abaſe* himſelf.

Dan. iv. 37. That walk in pride is able to *abaſe*.

ABASED, *adj.* depreſſed, caſt down. In heraldry it denotes the top of the wings of any bird to look down towards the point of the ſhield, or elſe to be ſhut. A chevron, bend, or pale, is *abaſed* when their points terminate in or below the centre of the ſhield: an ordinary is *abaſed* when below its due ſituation. This word is uſed in ſcripture to ſignify, to be diſgraced; or, to be humbled, as in

Iſa. xxxii. 29. The city ſhall be utterly *abaſed*.

Matt. xxiii. 12. Whoſoever ſhall exalt himſelf ſhall be *abased*. Luk. xv. 21. xviii. 14.

Phil. iv. 12. I know how to be *abased* and how to abound.

ABASING, *p.* uſed once in ſcripture, 2 Cor. xi. 7. Have I committed an offence in *abaſing*, &c.

ABASEMENT, *ſ.* [Fr.] depreſſion.

ABASSI, *ſ.* [Per.] a Perſian ſilver coin.

To ABASH, *v. a.* to affect with ſudden ſhame or confuſion.

To ABATE, *v. a.* [Fr.]

1. To leſſen and diminiſh, as the price of goods.

2. To depreſs the mind.

3. In law, to beat, to pull down, to deſtroy.

4. In horſemanſhip, the horſe is ſaid to *abate* his curvets when he puts both his hind legs to the gronnd, obſerving always the ſame exactneſs.

To ABATE, *v. a.*

1. To grow leſs.

2. In law, to be fruſtrated, to be rendered void.

ABATED, *p.* of *abate*, ſignifies, in ſcripture, leſſened, or taken away.

Gen. viii. 3. The waters were *abated*.

Lev. xxvii. 18. It ſhall be *abated* from thy eſtimation.

Deut. xxxiv. 7. Nor was Moſes' natural force *abated*.

Judg viii. 3. Then their anger was *abated* towards him.

ABBA, *ſ. p.* ſignifies a father. It is a Syriac word, derived from the Hebrew *Ab*. It is uſed,

Matt. xiv. 26. *Abba* father all things are poſſible to tnee.

Rom. viii. 15. The ſpirit whereby we cry *abba* father.

Gal. iv. 6. Sent the ſpirit into our hearts, crying *abba* father.

ABATELEM, *ſ.* [Fr.] the conſuls prohibition of trading iſſued againſt all French merchants in the Levant, who do not diſcharge their debts, or ſtand to their bargains.

ABATEMENT, *ſ.*

1. Remiſſion, abating, extenuation.

2. The cauſe of abating.

3. The ſtate of a perſon depoſed of a poſt.

ABAMEMENT, in law, the act of the abater.

ABATEMENT, in heraldry, a deminution of the dignity of a coat of arms.

ABATEMENT, in commerce, an allowance made for prompt payment.

ABATER, one who abates.

ABATOR, *ſ.* in law, one who enters on a houſe, or land, void by the death of the laſt poſſeſſor, before the heir takes poſſeſſion.

ABATUDE, *ſ.* a diminution, or a thing deminiſhed.

ABATURES, *ſ.* in hunting, the ſprigs of graſs thrown down by a ſtag in his paſſage.

To ABAY, *v. a.* to purchaſe dearly. (Out of uſe.)

ABB, *ſ.* the yarn of a weaver's warp.

ABB-WOOL, *ſ.* the ſame with *abb*.

ABBACY, *ſ.* [Lat.] the rights and juriſdiction of an abbot.

ABBATIS, *ſ.* a ſteward, or groom of the ſtables. (Old records)

ABBER, *ſ.* [Brit.] the mouth and fall of a river; often prefixed to the names of towns, as Aberdeen, Abercorn, &c.

ABBESS, *ſ.* [Fr.] the governeſs, or ſuperior of a female convent.

ABBEY, *ſ.* a religious houſe for either men or women.

ABBEY-LUBBER, *ſ.* a ſlothful loiterer in religious houſes.

ABBOT, *ſ.* the chief, or ſuperior of a convent, or fellowſhip of canons.

ABBOTSHIP, *ſ.* the ſtate or privilege of an abbot.

ABBY See ABBEY.

To ABBREVIATE, *v. a.* [Lat]. to ſhorten by contraction, to cut ſhort, to abridge.

ABBREVIATION, *ſ.* a contraction, an abridgement, a ſhortening of words, by leaving out ſome letters; it is much uſed by phyſicians, for the ſake of expedition and ſecrecy.

ABBREVIATOR, *ſ.* one who abbreviates.

ABBREVIATURE, *ſ.* a mark uſed for the ſake of ſhortening, as *M.* for a thouſand.

2. A compendium, or abridgement. *Taylor's guide.*

ABBREVOIR, *ſ.* [Fr.]

1. A watering-place. (*Out of uſe*).

2. In maſonry, the joint of two ſtones, that is to be filled up with mortar.

To ABBROCH, *v. a.* [Fr.] to buy up, to engroſs any commodities, to ſell again before they are brought to market.

ABBROCHMENT, foreſtalling.

ABDELAVI, *ſ.* the Egyptian melon.

ABDERAIN, *laughter*, inceſſent laughter, ſo called from Democritis, the laughing philoſopher, who was born at Abdera.

ABDEST, *ſ.* [Arab.] an ablation, or taking away, uſed amongſt the Mahometans before prayer, at entering their Moſques, or reading the Koran.

ABDEVENHAM, *ſ.* a term uſed by aſtronomers for the head of the twelfth houſe of the planets.

To ABDICATE, *v. a.* [Lat] to reſign, to give up one's right. This word occaſioned a tedious diſpute in the Engliſh parliament in 1687, when the laſt prince of the unhappy race of Stuarts deſerted the throne.

ABDICATION, *ſ.* the act of reſignation.

ABDICATIVE, *adj.* that which cauſes or implies an abdication.

ABDITIVE, *adj* having power to hide.

ABDITORIUM, *ſ.* [Lat.] a place in which goods or money were preſerved, in churches; a cheſt, *old records*.

ABDOMEN, *ſ.* [Lat.] the lower belly.

ABDOMINAL, or ABDOMINOUS, of, or belonging to the abdomen.

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